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"[Tlhe use. of union dues to pay for anti-affirmative action
lawsuits [helps to] fight 'discrimination levied against our nonminority members.'
'If you're going to agree there was discrimination ... ,then
you're punishing the people who had nothing to do with the
discrimination in the past. And the ones who were discriminated
in the past are not the ones receiving the benefit.""

"The dues should be refunded or put in an escrow account
because [the Union] has failed to represent the interests of its
minority... members ....

'We have to be proactive on how we deal with one
another ....And the union should start that process, but they
don't have a program for affirmative action. They don't have a
plan to have us even talk communally ...

sensitivity training ...

,

,

to have some

to address some of the problems we

historically have."2
l. Glenn Jeffers, Race Still Divides Firehouses:Bias Often Hidden but can Flare Up,
Minorities Assert, CHi. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2004, at Cl, C19 (quoting James McNally, President
of Local 2 of the Chicago, Illinois, Fire Fighters Union).
2. Gary Washburn, Blacks Call ForNew Fire Union Boss: ProtestersAllege Bias in
Asking for Refunds on Dues, CHI. TIB., May 31, 2002, METRO SECT., at 3 (quoting Nick
Russell, Battalion Chief of Chicago, Illinois, Firefighters and head of the African American
Firefighters League, a coalition of black firefighters in Chicago). In 2002, the African
American Firefighters League marched on the headquarters of their union, Local 2 of the

2004]

I.

RACIAL JUSTICE IN UNIONS

INTRODUCTION

The year 2004 represents a significant point in time for labor unions
and their black members. The quotes at the beginning of this article by a
white union leader and then a black member of the same union,
respectively, highlight the concerns that resonate today with employees of
color3 and their unions, as both groups struggle to deal with the issue of
racial justice in the workplace
Black employees who challenge discrimination in the workplace are at
the center of this struggle. They usually fight their battles alone and
typically have unsuccessful results whether pursuing their claims in courts
or through alternative dispute resolution systems. In those rare examples of
successful court challenges to employment discrimination, a possible
Chicago Fire Fighters Union, demanded the resignation of the union's then new president,
and sought the refund of $6.5 million in dues paid over the last two decades by minority and
female members after new union President James McNally, an outspoken opponent of
affirmative action, took office by winning sixty-two percent of the vote in the union
election. Id. While acknowledging that a separate union might be better to address the
concerns of the African American Firefighters League, their leader, Battalion Chief Nick
Russell, agreed that he was stopping short of asking for a separate union because only Local
2 can legally represent Chicago firefighters in negotiating wages and benefits. Id. But
Russell asserted that another group might be able to negotiate racial and human rights
issues. Id.
3. In this Article, I focus on racial justice in terms of discrimination committed in the
workplace primarily against black males. For consistency, I mostly use the term "black"
rather than "African-American" when addressing race, but I consider the terms to be
synonymous in this article along with the term "Negro," which may also be used with
"African-American" when quoting other sources. Similar to the author's discussion in the
preface to a rich new exploration of racial justice, I have not "unwittingly reinscribed the socalled black/white binary that permeates so many analyses of race" because I do recognize
that "racism in America is not a two-dimensional picture." MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL.,
WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY ix (2003). Rather, I agree
with the point recently made by those authors of a 2003 book that examines racial justice,
Michael K. Brown, Martin Camoy, Elliott Currie, Troy Duster, David B. Oppenheimer,
Marjorie M. Schultz and David Wellman: "[T]he conservative consensus on race is mostly
constructed around the relationship between black and white .... [T]he black/white binary
persists as a feature of every day life and is crucial to the commonsense understanding of
racism." Id. at x. For these reasons, I have focused on blacks and whites, and primarily
black males versus white males in this Article. See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law,
Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 215 n.16 (2002) ("[S]ome
believe that the racial identity of all groups has been politically and legally defined by the
line between blackness and whiteness."). But see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
1144, 1184 n.127 (1998) (criticizing the black/white binary paradigm in discussing race
from an outsider perspective as a Latino, neither white nor black). Also, I may refer to
people of color, in general, or other races as it becomes necessary for clarity or depth.
4. A more detailed discussion of the recent racial justice issues occurring for black
Chicago firefighters and their majority white male union are explored infra, Part III.B.2.
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consequence could be the adoption of an affirmative action program to
remedy the effects of past discrimination in the workplace. With some
unions, especially majority white unions where blacks were historically
denied access, affirmative action plans are challenged even up to the point
of using union membership dues to fight attempts to provide racial justice
for blacks.
Ironically, these same unions argue that seniority and other traditional
methods of selection should trump affirmative action efforts to deliver
racial justice when it is those very same seniority and traditional selection
systems that created discrimination against blacks in the first place and still
continue to perpetuate direct discrimination against blacks today.' While
disregarding this point, these unions also argue that discrimination against
white majority members occurs when employers consider race through an
affirmative action plan.
With these unions involved, it all becomes a bitter and vicious cycle
where individual black employees first sue the employer for discrimination.
As a result, an employer may implement or be ordered to implement some
form of affirmative action policy as a response. To close the loop, white
employees, especially those in their majority-based union, respond by
taking legal action to challenge the implementation of the affirmative
action response.
Within this cycle, the need for legal support in pursuing these claims
represents a key concern. Individual black employees do not have the
financial or legal support of their union to challenge discrimination in the
first instance. These black employees then become appalled to find that
affirmative action efforts to provide them with some form of justice in the
workplace are being challenged in reverse discrimination suits in court by
the very union that they support with their union dues. Unions have the
financial wherewithal to obtain legal support directly and use it in bringing
reverse discrimination claims or other challenges to affirmative action,
whereas individual black employees do not have financial or other means
to obtain the legal support needed to confront direct discrimination in the
workplace.
Possibly, the use of union funds to support legal challenges to
affirmative action does not represent a major concern given the relatively
small impact that unions now have in the United States. Admittedly, the
percentage of workers represented by labor unions in the last fifty years has
significantly diminished.6 Whatever the reasons for organized labor's
5. See infra text accompanying notes 103-108.
6. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformationof American Labor Unions,
69 Mo. L. REv. 365, 365 (2004) ("The decline of unionization in the United States is a
phenomenon that has been well-documented."). See also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and
Employment Law at the Millennium: A HistoricalReview and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C.
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drastic decline,' it has reached a crucial juncture where it can either go
forward with successful and measured growth, or it can become extinct.
This year 2004 marks a significant time period in our history for racial
justice in and out of the workplace. Many celebrations have occurred in
light of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Brown v. Board of Education,' which banned the Jim Crow concept of
separate but equal in education. Also, just last summer, the Supreme Court
issued another landmark decision regarding racial justice in Grutter v.
Bollinger.9 In Grutter,the Court found that there was a compelling interest
L. REv. 351, 361-62 (2002) (chronicling the clear decline in American unions over the last
fifty years with 31.5% of the non-agricultural labor force being unionized in 1950, 34.7% in
1954, down to 24.7% by 1970, 16.1% by 1990, and 13.5% in 2000 and even more drastic
drops in total union membership over this time in the private sector, which is essentially a
drop from over thirty percent in 1950 to only nine percent in 2000); William R. Corbett,
Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 262 (2002) (noting that unions are no longer "a major
player in most workplaces ... and represent only about thirteen and a half percent of the
workforce and about nine percent of the private sector workforce" in 2000); Katherine V.W.
Stone, The New Psychological Contract:Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor
and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 651-54 (2001) (recognizing diminished labor
and making broad proposals that would change the landscape if a citizen union formed to
take up employee issues); Paul C. Weiler, A PrincipledReshaping of Labor Law for the
Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 185-86 (2001) (noting a decline in
unionism from about forty percent of the private sector in 1947 down to less than ten
percent in the late 1990s, and noting a corresponding reduction of at least twenty percent in
wages).
7. See Jame J. Brudney et al., JudicialHostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social BackgroundModel to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1738-39 (1999)
(addressing the correlation between judicial hostility and the lack of union growth); Joel
Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1, 82 n.222 (suggesting that labor's present
inability to expand its base has resulted from its actions that "alienated itself from the great
social and protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s"). In 1986, Professor Jack Getman
asserted that organized labor may be taking a self-defeatist attitude and blaming too much of
its failure on coercive employers and harsh laws instead of confessing its own complacency
as a reason for its failures. Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the
Private Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 76-77 (1986) (discussing criticisms of organized
labor). However, in 2002, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) Union President John Sweeney told a Senate committee that there
were several campaign tactics that were used by employers to dissuade workers from
supporting union representation and those tactics "lay out the dimensions of problems
workers in this country face." Fawn H. Johnson, Senate Committee Explores Difficulties
Workers Face in OrganizingCampaigns, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 120, at A-1 (June 21,
2002). More recently, Professor Getman criticized many facets of labor law as being the
source of organized labor's decline: "the overall anti-union trend of the law must certainly
have some role in the overall difficulty unions face in organizing .. " Julius Getman, The
National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REv. 125,
138 (2003).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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for public universities to consider racial "diversity" in the admissions
process when analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
In Grutter, Justice Sandra Day
Amendment of the Constitution."
O'Connor acknowledged that "in a society, like our own .... race
unfortunately still matters.""
This year 2004 also brings us to the fortieth anniversary of the passage
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which established landmark
protections by banning employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, and sex. 3 Despite the growth in equal opportunities
from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, commentators continue to
complain about the difficulties for those seeking to obtain racial justice
today through an individual claim under Title VII.' As an example of this
dissatisfaction with Title VII, a "myriad of civil rights and social justice
organizations" have all supported a recent bill introduced in Congress on
February 11, 2004, FAIRNESS: The Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809
and S. 2088, which would "counteract the potentially devastating impact of
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions" and provide guarantees of "viable
remedies for on-the-job discrimination."15
10. Id. at 328 ("[W]e hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body.").
11. Id. After acknowledging that race matters enough today (in 2003 at the time of the
decision), Justice O'Connor expressed the hope that it would not matter as much twenty-five
years from now, so race-conscious measures may not be a compelling interest for college
admissions by then. Id. at 343 ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
12. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in pertinent part
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17 (2000)).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l) to -(2) (2000).
14. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (assessing federal court disposition of
employment discrimination cases at the pre-trial stage and finding that employers prevailed
in ninety-eight percent of those cases).
15. See Ritu Kelotra, Fairness: The Civil Rights Act of 2004, 13 POVERTY & RACE:
POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL 5 (Mar./Apr. 2004), available at
The civil rights and
http://www.civilrights.org/issues/enforcement/details.cfm?id=22723.
social organizations supporting this legislation included the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights (LCCR), the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La
Raza, the National Organization for Women (NOW) Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the
National Women's Law Center (NWLC). Id. The bill was sponsored by Senator Edward
Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts and Congressmen John Lewis, a Georgia
Democrat, George Miller, a California Democrat, and John Conyers, a Michigan Democrat.
In addition to several items focused on discrimination issues outside of race or employment
(such as allowing disparate impact claims for age discrimination and for discrimination by
recipients of federal funds, along with allowing states to be sued for various employment
claims), this proposed legislation offers more racial justice by providing victims of
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At such a crucial time in our history, major concerns exist regarding
the viability of labor unions and the capability of employees to pursue
racial justice in the workplace with any success. Continued improvement
within both movements may depend upon finding a cohesive intersection
between them. With the race and class divide affecting relations between
organized labor and black workers (a dilemma which must be explored in
more detail), 6 this Article offers the thesis that there remains an area of
opportunity for justice where interests of unions and black employees may
coalesce: providing legal assistance to unrepresented" black employees in
employment discrimination with a clear right to sue in court instead of being forced into
arbitration as a condition of employment, and it also establishes the clear right to recover
attorney's fees, litigation costs, and a full measure of punitive damages rather than being
subjected to arbitrary limitations on those forms of financial compensation. Id. at 5-7. The
key objectives involving racial justice in the workplace from this legislation would be
achieved by reversing the effects of the following Supreme Court decisions: Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages for private
lawsuits alleging disability discrimination when brought against public entities under
Section 202 of the American with Disabilities Act or against recipients of federal funding
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001) (enforcing an agreement that forced employees to give up their rights to go to
court as a condition of employment and instead resolve their discrimination claims in
arbitration); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605, 609-10 (2001) (finding that if a defendant "voluntarily" changes his or
her conduct as a result of a plaintiff's lawsuit and thereby circumvents the need for further
injunctive relief, the plaintiff may not recover attorneys' fees from the defendant, absent a
court judgment, even if the lawsuit was the catalyst for the defendant's change in conduct).
16. See discussion infra Part III.C.
17. I have purposefully chosen to use the term "unrepresented" in this Article to mean
without legal representation. I use "unrepresented" with the broader understanding that it
applies equally to employees represented by a union regarding working conditions and those
not represented by a union because individual employees, even in a union environment, tend
to pursue Title VII employment discrimination claims separately from and without the direct
support of their unions. See Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and
Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's
Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 201-03 (2000) (describing
difficulties for employees if unions were involved in directly handling Title VII claims and
why employees should be allowed to go forward without the union being able to waive
those rights). Also, "unrepresented" means more in this Article than just operating in a
court system without legal representation. It is extended to any situation where an employee
has a discrimination dispute with an employer and obtaining legal advice could be helpful,
regardless of whether the claim has reached a court or will ever be brought in a court.
Although terms like "self-represented" and "pro se" can be considered synonymous with
"unrepresented," I use "unrepresented" throughout because "self-represented" and "pro se"
may tend to wrongly connote that the employees are proceeding voluntarily without legal
representation when it is more than likely not a choice. See Russell Engler, And Justice for
All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judge, Mediators, and
Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1992 n.23 (1999) (stating:
Throughout this Article, I consciously choose the term 'unrepresented litigants'
in most cases instead of 'self-represented,' 'pro se,' or 'pro per.' The prefix
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pursuing their individual discrimination disputes with their employers.
Individual black employees, whether in unions or not in unions, need
legal assistance in navigating the complex requirements to establish an
employment discrimination claim under Title VII. As a result, unions can
help black employees who are union members and those who are not union
members in obtaining legal counsel and providing other assistance needed
to pursue their discrimination claims effectively. If a particular union is
unable to foster enough support to provide direct legal assistance to
individual black employees because of the race divisions within its own
ranks, it can allow racial identity coalitions, caucuses and associations
within the union to allocate their dues directly for that type of legal
assistance. Black union members can receive direct legal assistance from
union lawyers, or as part of a general legal assistance plan made available
to both black union members and, in general, to black employees who do
not work in a union-organized environment. By addressing the legal
assistance needs of union workers and the same needs for a significant and
growing majority of non-union workers, unions can promote racial justice
along a broader spectrum.
Under this thesis, unions and their black members may also obtain a
fair balance along the race and class divide. Black union members can
capitalize on the value of having their voices heard and their union dues
used directly for racial justice through their black identity coalition. They
can accomplish this while still working within the general union structure
to maintain overall solidarity regarding class and salary issues with their
employer.
In exploring this thesis, Part II of this Article reviews the problems for
an unrepresented black employee trying to obtain racial justice in and out
of the courts. It highlights the significant concern that individuals have in
pursuing employment discrimination claims without adequate legal
assistance and advice either in the court system or through informal
alternatives to court adjudication. Part II also explains how the employees'
'un-' means 'not,' the 'opposite of.' The literal definition therefore is 'not
represented,' indicating a 'lack of representation .... Because the focus of this
Article is the unrepresented poor, the concept of 'not represented' best captures
the plight of indigent litigants who appear without lawyers and who, essentially,
are not heard by the court.... The concept of 'self-representation' connotes the
choice to forego counsel and probably some perceived ability to carry out the
representation of oneself... This does not describe the predicament of most of
the unrepresented poor and should not form our operating assumptions in
attempting to fashion solutions. ... For similar reasons, and because I prefer
English to Latin, I prefer the term 'unrepresented litigants' to 'pro se' ('for
himself') and 'pro per' (the abbreviation for 'in propria persona,' California's
version of 'pro se,' meaning 'in one's own proper person').
(citations omitted)).
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inability to obtain legal counsel in discrimination claims represents a major
opportunity for unions to make a contribution to racial justice by
establishing a counterbalance to the employer counsel's repeat player
advantage in resolving these disputes.
Then, Part III of this Article examines the urgency of the need for
unions to embrace racial justice in some important form as the workplace
becomes more diverse. Part III discusses the specifics surrounding the
historical discrimination against blacks by unions. It also addresses the
current concern that unions are taking up the fight in some instances to
challenge affirmative action efforts to remedy discrimination. Despite this
history and the current racial justice issues in the workplace that call for
labor's action, battles about whether class versus race or vice versa should
be the focus of organized labor have created stagnation and more division.
Nevertheless, unions must face the racial division and harm that occurs as
black union members continue to challenge workplace discrimination on an
individual basis with little legal or other support from their unions. Some
of these unions even exacerbate this lack of legal help and their racial
divisions by using their black members' union dues to take legal action to
stop affirmative action efforts intended to combat race discrimination
against blacks, which were offered for the benefit of those same black
union members. With this backdrop, Part III of the Article asserts that it
has become of paramount importance for unions to embrace racial justice
as they owe it to their black members who have faced such a long history
of exclusion.
Part IV of this Article proposes the matching of a black employee's
significant need for legal assistance in pursuing an employment
discrimination claim with the ability of unions to fulfill this need. With
their collective power, unions and their black members can creatively
establish legal service plans for black employees needing legal assistance.
By taking on this legal assistance, unions can seek racial justice by relying
on union dues and support from black identity caucuses, coalitions, and
associations within organized labor. This allows a focus on race to exist
under a unifying theme for unions and their black members without
distracting the union membership from pursuing its general class
improvement goals.
In Part V, this Article concludes that offering mechanisms to find
lawyers for black employees in individual employment discrimination
disputes fulfills a major need for black employees and unions at such a
critical time for both groups. It beseeches unions to find a way to make
this happen as it may represent a last chance for them to significantly
embrace some form of racial justice before their role in the workplace
becomes completely diminished.
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OBTAINING COUNSEL FOR UNREPRESENTED EMPLOYEES: AN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION DILEMMA FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

II.

Shortly before the Supreme Court issued its Grutter 8 decision, the
writer of that opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, spoke to the 2003 law
school graduating class of George Washington University. In that speech,
Justice O'Connor recognized that one of the greatest challenges to our
system of justice remains the inability of claimants to obtain counsel.' She
emphasized the importance of that challenge and its implication on racial
justice in our society when she stated, "There is sad evidence all across the
nation that a substantial number of our citizens believe our legal and
judicial system is unresponsive to them because of racial bias, that too
often equal justice is but an unrealized slogan."20 She then urged those new
law graduates "to volunteer to help people who cannot pay for legal help."'"
Despite Justice O'Connor's encouragement of new attorneys to work
for racial justice,22 the reality remains for most employees pursuing
employment discrimination claims that they face little hope of finding an
Only about five percent of those pursuing employment
attorney."
discrimination claims find attorneys to represent them in court.2

18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
19. See Anne Gearan, Work for Racial Justice, O'Connor Tells Law School's Grads, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 26, 2003, at 3A.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Gearan's characterization of O'Connor's speech).
22. Id.
23. See Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer BargainingPower in
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 77, 99 n.95 (2003) (describing and citing articles discussing the
difficulties for employees in finding legal representation); see also Lewis Maltby, Paradise
Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to
Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 2-3 (1994) (noting that most
employment cases do not have a potential recovery large enough for plaintiffs' attorneys to
take the risk); Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims with Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 283 n.400 (1996) (noting that the problem of access to the
court system is particularly difficult for employment discrimination claimants).
24. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective BargainingContext, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 491, 499 (2001) (noting that only about five percent of plaintiffs
seeking counsel with an employment claim in court are able to obtain counsel); see also
William Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination,50 DISP. RESOL. J. 40,
44 (Oct.-Dec., 1995) (describing survey of plaintiff's counsel); Lewis L. Maltby,
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 105, 106-107 nn.l-3
(2003) (describing a study finding that "a minimum level of provable damages of $60,000"
is necessary before most plaintiff's counsel will accept an employment case and referring to
testimony by plaintiffs' counsel Paul Tobias, a founder of the National Employment
Lawyers Association (NELA), in front of the Dunlop Commission, established jointly by the
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Nevertheless, the complexities of employment discrimination law require
the need for creative and innovative lawyers in this practice area.25
Our "adversary system assumes equally skilled advocates on opposing
sides. 26 Little has been written about how a judge can deal with the
unrepresented litigant." There is no clear mechanism for the judge to "step
in on the side of the pro se party to level the playing field."28 Nevertheless,
the judge must be concerned about the unrepresented party having a fair
opportunity to be heard without stepping over the bounds required for
judicial impartiality.29 As one judicial commentator has explained, this
dilemma highlights "the tightrope the judge must walk between giving the
pro se litigant a30 day in court while still remaining a neutral, impartial
decision-maker.
In addressing this dilemma, one of the most difficult scenarios for a
judge occurs when the other side is represented by counsel who advocates
for his or her client by seeking to "prevent unrepresented litigants from
adducing testimony or other evidence to support their cases. ' Judges
must find a fair balance in handling these objections while trying to ensure
the unrepresented litigant understands the basis well enough to make a
response. These situations tend to arise in employment cases where the
employer has counsel and the employee is likely to be unrepresented. In
these situations, an employer's counsel will probably take heed of the
comments recently made by Judge Mark A. Drummond:

Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Commerce in 1993 to develop recommendations on
workplace improvements, where Tobias acknowledged that because of financial necessity,
"the plaintiffs' employment bar turns away at least 95% of those employees who seek its
help"). These findings were also described significantly in a recent empirical study of
employment arbitration decisions. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An
EmpiricalStudy of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 782-83 & nn. 20-25 (2003).
25. See Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L.
REv. 277, 277-82 (referring to the need for workplace lawyers to be "innovators" and noting
that workplace inequities are becoming more complex and moving to a "second generation"
requiring collaborative problem-solving skills).
26. Mark A. Drummond, Pro Se Litigants Pose Challenges: Section and Other Groups
Searchingfor Answers, LITIG. NEWS, Sept. 2003, at 7 (quoting retired bankruptcy judge C.
Timothy Corcoran).
27. But see Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving SelfRepresented Litigants, 42 JUDGES' J. 16, 16 (2003) (discussing how judges "can deal with
self-represented litigants in the courtroom without departing from the judicial role as a
neutral, impartial decision maker").
28. Drummond, supra note 26, at 7.
29. Albrecht et al., supra note 27, at 45 (arguing that "the trial judge can ensure the
self-represented litigant's right to be heard without departing from the judge's duty to
remain impartial").
30. Drummond, supra note 26, at 7.
31. Albrecht et al., supra note 27, at 47.

66

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 7:1

There is perhaps no greater fear for... lawyers than the fear of
going against a pro se litigant. What if you lose? It is a long
walk back to the office. Our ego is at stake. We justifiably feel
proud of our law license. It took a lot of money, hours, and hard
work to earn, and now we face an amateur in court.32
Most lawyer ethical rules do not directly address attorney dealings
with unrepresented litigants other than the proscription against giving legal
advice to an unrepresented party.33 Unless legal assistance is meaningless,
achieving racial justice without it represents a significant hardship and adds
to the perception of an unjust system that is designed only for the "haves"
in our society to the exclusion of the "have-nots."3'
A. Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Frustrations Without
Counsel
Beyond the inability to obtain legal representation,35 employees
bringing race discrimination claims in court face other barriers to achieving
success. Those barriers include: difficulties with problems of proof,36 the
32. See Mark A. Drummond, How Do You Handle the Pro Se Adversary?: "Be
Professional" is Often the Best Advice, LITIG. NEWS, Sept. 2003, at 7.
33. See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of
Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 80-81 & n.6
(1997) (citing Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 (1993)); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.4(b) (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
rule 2 4.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004) (requiring that a lawyer mediator make sure any
self-represented party understands the lawyer mediator's role in mediation and that the
lawyer mediator cannot give the self-represented party legal advice).
34. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95 (1974).
35. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 239 (1997) (describing disincentives in
the law and overall difficulties for plaintiffs' attorneys undertaking representation of clients
in civil rights litigation and noting from a survey of plaintiffs' attorneys that the economics
involved may make it hard even for someone with a good case to find an attorney if the
person does not have the resources to pay a retainer or legal fees).
36. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law,
61 LA. L. REv. 577 (2001); see also Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof In
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205,
1280-85 (1981) (criticizing the burdens that are placed on plaintiffs to prove discrimination
and the limited burden on the employer to disprove it); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1008-09
(1994) (assessing the difficulties in meeting the burden of proof requirements established by
the Supreme Court in proving race discrimination under Title VII); Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (1978) (questioning the Supreme
Court's race discrimination jurisprudence, which focuses on the mindset and acts of the
alleged perpetrator rather than the consequences and conditions for the victim); Deborah C.
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requirements of showing intentional discrimination versus discriminatory
impact,37 agency enforcement issues," and grant of summary judgment. 9
Maybe these difficulties reflect a general decline in sympathy for
blacks or other victims of discrimination.' On the other hand, this may
indicate a judiciary that appears to be somewhat hostile to these claims.
Although "[p]laintiffs lawyers admit it's tough to beat employers in
discrimination cases.... even some of them are surprised by a study that
shows plaintiffs fare worse in federal appellate job bias cases than in any
other kind of civil case."'" The authors of that study, Theodore Eisenberg
and Stewart J. Schwab, found that federal appeals courts "reversed nearly
44 percent of plaintiffs' victories in employment discrimination cases
between 1988 and 1997." 4" The "courts reversed fewer than 6 percent of
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229,
2230-32 (1995) (noting the Supreme Court's shifting burden of production and overall proof
requirements for Title VII claims); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discriminationin Employment: The Casefor Numerical Standards,79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1657
(1991) (suggesting that because Title VII litigation is costly and its scheme of proof makes
it difficult to discover discriminatory motives, employers should be required to hire
minorities in proportion to their percentage in the national population).
37. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach To Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1245 & n.343 (1995) (discussing some forms of discrimination that are unconscious);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323 (1987) (noting that much of racism is
unconscious and irrational); see also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REv. 59,
70 (1972) (arguing that a disparate impact theory of discrimination which does not require a
showing of intentional discrimination is necessary to prevent employers from perpetuating
the societal discrimination of the past).
38. See Michael Z. Green, Proposinga New Paradigmfor EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REv. 305,
307 (2001) (arguing that the EEOC "has never met the intended goal of becoming a key
mechanism in eradicating discrimination in the workplace"); Maurice E.R. Munroe, The
EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 219, 219 (1995) ("This
Article argues that Congress should relieve the EEOC of its duty to process individual
charges so that the agency can concentrate on combatting broader unlawful practices.");
Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining The Agency's Role In Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (exploring the value of the EEOC);
Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 219, 222
(1994) (discussing the efficacy of antidiscrimination laws).
39. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 14, at 560-61 (assessing federal court disposition of
employment discrimination cases at the pre-trial stage and finding that employers prevailed
in nearly ninety-eight percent of those cases).
40. See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 575,
583-92 (2003) (discussing "a decline in sympathy for victims of discrimination in the
judicial system and why that might be so").
41. See Susan Mandel, Equal Treatment? Study Shows a Wide Gap Between Worker,
Employer Wins in Job Bias Appeals, 87 A.B.A. J. 24 (Nov. 2001).
42. Id.
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employers' victories during the same period," and this "plaintiff-defense
disparity was greater than in any of 24 other categories of civil cases." 3 In
commenting on this study, prominent plaintiffs'
employment
discrimination lawyers, Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri, found
that the results indicate that federal appellate courts ignore their obligation
to defer to fact-finders in these cases:
It would appear that employment discrimination plaintiffs are
treated as second class citizens in the workplace and as second
class litigants in the federal courts of appeals. For example, when
a plaintiff appeals a defendant's victory at trial, she has no more
than a 5% chance of reversing the defendant's victory on appeal;
but if a defendant appeals a plaintiff s trial victory, the defendant
has an incredible 43% chance of reversing the plaintiff' s victory.
The 43% success rate for defendants who appeal is particularly
troubling when one considers that these are cases in which
plaintiffs typically have already overcome difficult summary
judgment motions, prevailed at trial, and survived post-trial
motions. Further, employment discrimination cases that reach
trial are almost always fact-intensive, and appellate courts are
obligated to defer to the district court fact-finders with respect to
factual determinations. "
Because of the harsh results for employees, some commentators now
believe that the court system provides little refuge and may even create
false hope about the eradication of racial problems in our society. 5

43. Id.
44. See Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. & Cyrus Mehri, EmpiricalStudy Suggests Bias in U.S.
Appellate Courts, available at http://www.findjustice.com/ms/civil-just/joint-statement.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
45. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in
Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REV. 201, 223 (1982) ("Thus, through symbolic
gestures, imbued with a feigned impotence, the law is able to render protest for real change
quiescent, while preserving the dominant status quo. In light of the foregoing discussion,
the limits of antidiscrimination law become depressingly clear."). Professors Derrick Bell
and Richard Delgado are also proponents of this approach. See Derrick A. Bell, Racial
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (suggesting that civil rights leaders should abandon
efforts to use the law and the legal system to remedy the effects of discrimination in our
society by coming to the racial realism or acknowledgment that discrimination has survived
and will continue to survive and cause frustration within a legal system that endorses
racism) (hereinafter, Bell, Racial Realism); Derrick Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now
What?, 35 How. L.J. 79, 84 (1991); Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics and an
Infinity-Based Response: Will Endless Talking Cure America's Racial Ills?, 80 GEO. L. J.
1879, 1881-82 (1992) ("Racism is deeply ingrained in our culture, affecting how we see
ourselves and others, and how we organize social life."); Richard Delgado, On Taking Back
Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 583
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Accordingly, a labor and employment law professor, Ronald Turner,
counsels us to be wary about the prospects for justice through employment
discrimination law by concluding that "Title VII cannot reach or bring
about the avowed and ever more distant statutory goal of ending the
exclusion of African-Americans and other protected groups from the
changing economic mainstream. '" By seeking to find a way to bridge the
significant gap in legal representation, this Article does not purport to rest
upon some "litigation romanticist" notion that racial justice can only be
achieved by court resolution of employment discrimination claims."
Obviously, providing legal counsel, alone, does not overcome the
significant hurdles that plaintiffs must endure to prevail in an employment
discrimination claim. Nevertheless, the opportunity for legal representation
by victims of employment discrimination should be a reasonable
expectation of the racial justice process and not a rare surprise or a virtual
impossibility.
B. Alternatives to Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its
FrustrationsWithout Counsel
Given the dismal results from the court system regarding employment
discrimination, the possibilities of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR),
In a
in particular, arbitration and mediation, warrants some discussion.
"The
Association,
Bar
recent study commissioned by the American
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Court," Marc Galanter found that "although 11.5 percent of all
civil cases went to trial in 1962, a mere 1.8 percent go to trial today, even
though five times as many civil actions are filed."' Also, in 1962, the
("The circle of redressable racism shrank as courts required proof of intent to
discriminate ....).
46. Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 479-80 (1995). While I agree with this concern, I remain a
bit of a litigation romanticist (albeit a frustrated one) in that I still believe with some
skepticism that there is a major role for the law and the court system in shaping racial justice
in our society. See Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 807 (1994) ("[T]he law will come to favor the more
concentrated class of parties with an interest in the law."). But see Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared To Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (1996) (discussing how it is difficult to even use the adjudication or litigation system
when it is geared to force parties to settle). The Brown v. Board of Education and Grutter v.
Bollinger cases are examples of those admittedly rare but crucial roles for the law and the
court, and there are other examples. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(prohibiting states from enforcing racially restrictive covenants under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophicaland
DemocraticDefense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669 (1995).
48. See John Austin, Jury Trials May Be Headed to Vanishing Point, 29 LITIG. NEWS 1,
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"average federal judge conducted 39 trials a year, including both civil and
criminal cases" as compared to now when "federal judges average 13.""
Today, the federal courts face significant Congressional budget and
staffing cuts that leave the federal judiciary "with $267.2 million less than
it indicated was necessary to maintain services" for fiscal year 2004.50
These cuts place "pressures on the courts regarding juror usage."'" This
does not bode well for increasing access to the federal courts.5 2 Rather, it
appears that with these limitations we have reached a significant
transformation in our legal system, where the reality has become that most
disputes in the twenty-first century are going to be resolved by some
process that is an alternative to the courts' trial process.
Beyond direct resolution by settlement, a great number of
employment discrimination disputes are being funneled into the arbitration
or mediation process for resolution. 3
One could question whether
employers have made informed judgments in pursuing these alternatives
when the court system provides such overwhelming results in their favor."
Despite the fact that "employees lose employment discrimination claims on
average ninety percent of the time, .. . employers are so fascinated with the
prospect of preventing those ten percent from getting to a jury that they are
devising mandatory arbitration agreements."55
Likewise, employers,

1 (ABA May 20, 2004).
49. Id. at 2.
50. Katerina M. Eftimoff, Staffing Cuts Expected in Federal Courts: Budget Shortages
Threaten "Justicefor All"?, 29 LITIG. NEWS 1, 1 (ABA May 20, 2004).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial: More and More Cases are Settled,
Mediated or Arbitrated Without a Public Resolution. Will the Trend Harm the Justice
System?, 88 A.B.A. J. 24, 26 (Oct. 2002) (describing how the major decrease in trial rates
has come as a result of using private forms of adjudication including arbitration and
mediation).
54. See generally Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From
Using Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 443-62
(2000) (questioning the increasing use of arbitration by employers for handling employment
discrimination claims when they handily win in courts as a disconnect between employers
and their counsel over fees).
55. Green, supra note 23, at 96 n.86 (citing Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural
Differences Between Litigating in Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 633, 640 (2001)) (suggesting that because of the uncertainty of litigation,
employers may still choose to arbitrate even though there may be better results for them in
court because arbitration is more predictable in terms of "knowing in advance how much a
case might cost and how long it might last"). Some are turned off by the use of the word
"mandatory" when referring to arbitration agreements entered into by employees as an
adhesion contract and required by the employer as a condition of employment because they
feel "mandatory" somehow labels the process as unfair or possibly illegal. See Hill, supra
note 24, at 780 n.10 (stating that the "term 'mandatory' implies that the employee has no
real choice" and "'pre-dispute agreement' is used to describe the same agreements, but lacks
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government agencies, and a number of private professional organizations
have started to prefer the use of mediation in resolving employment
discrimination disputes. 56
One concern from the court system that translates into ADR is the
question of a repeat player advantage for employers. 7 Lisa Bingham
explained that one possible reason for this repeat player advantage for
employers might be that "many employees are going into employment
arbitration hearings without the benefit of counsel." 8 Similarly, Samuel
Estreicher, a labor and employment law professor, recently noted that to the
extent there is any repeat player effect in employment arbitration, it is
likely that "the real repeat players in arbitration are not the parties
themselves but the lawys involved."59 Given the complexity of
the implication that the employee has no choice but to agree to arbitration" so "the term
'promulgated agreement' was chosen to stay out of the "debate over the legality of the predispute, pre-hire agreement to employment arbitration"). I consider this debate about the
wording to be semantics, but I recognize that there are some who are upset about the term
"mandatory."
56. See Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth, Participants' Satisfaction With EEO
Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation:An Empirical Inquiry, 6 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 392 (2002) (highlighting the preference for mediation in employment
discrimination claims); see also Green, supra note 38, at 330-34 (describing the
effectiveness of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) program which
mediates employment discrimination claims).
57. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223, 234 (1998) (finding that when one-shot employees face arbitration with repeat player
employers, the employees win only about sixteen percent of the time as opposed to a
seventy percent win rate when employees are not involved with repeat player employers);
Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 767,
768-69 (1996) (regarding repeat player effect in mediation). See generally Carrie MenkelMeadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat
Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 19 (1999) (commenting on the effects of
repeat players in ADR).
58. Bingham, supra note 57, at 241-42 n.47 (quoting Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due
Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108
(1996)). See also Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century:
Challenges in a Changing Environment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 500 (2003) ("in
my experience employers in general receive better, or at least more consistent,
representation" as the "would-be plaintiff may have trouble hiring any lawyer" and
"[w]ithout one, and facing the defendant's counsel, the worker stands virtually no chance of
victory"); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 198 (1997) ("[American Arbitration Association] case
files reveal that a substantial proportion of employees are unrepresented in employment
arbitration."); Helen B. Culiner, Practical Guidelinesfor Lawyers Representing Clients in
Arbitration ProceedingsToday, 49 Disp. RESOL. J. 48 (Sept. 1994) (describing various legal
issues to be aware of in arbitration including challenging the scope of the arbitration clause,
basis for seeking judicial challenge of the arbitration award and what laws may apply).
59. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
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employment discrimination claims, it is not surprising to see that a lack of a
repeat player counsel with innovative, problem solving skills would affect
the handling of a claim.' °
Although critics of arbitration consider it coercive, some
commentators have asserted that arbitration may still be better for
employees because of their inability to obtain counsel and the difficulty of
prevailing in the court system without counsel.' This "lesser of the two
evils" argument significantly ignores the elephant in the room as the lack of
legal representation in the court system also represents a major concern in
alternatives to the court system.62
Lewis Maltby initially highlighted the lack of legal representation in
court as a reason why arbitration may be a gocd option for employees.63 He
recently addressed the issue of not having legal representation in arbitration
and suggested that lawyers may represent employees in arbitration much
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 566
(2001); see also Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, supra note
58, at 197-200 (discussing lawyers as repeat players in employment arbitration and noting
that it is very unlikely that even a "less able" plaintiffs' lawyer will become a repeat player
lawyer in employment arbitration).
60. Sturm, supra note 25, at 277-82.
61. See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's
Impact and Legacy, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1996) (distinguishing between the
need for legal representation in court versus arbitration, especially given the difficulty of
finding an attorney, and assuming that if the process is fair, one of the benefits will be that
the employee can be self-represented); Estreicher, supra note 59, at 563-64 (describing
difficulties for most plaintiffs in obtaining counsel in the court system and suggesting that
"lower costs of the forum also mean lower costs for their representatives (which could
include unions)"); David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99-100 (1999) (describing the
unattractiveness of arbitration cases to plaintiffs' lawyers); St. Antoine, supra note 24, at
499 (highlighting the fact that only about five percent of plaintiffs seeking counsel with an
employment claim in court are able to obtain counsel and suggesting that if parties in
arbitration cannot obtain "a first-rate lawyer" due to the low recovery potential, they can
represent themselves or be represented by laypersons, similar to labor arbitration where a
collective bargaining agent is the representative).
62. See Tina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for
Legal Services Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 181, 186 & n.35 (2003) (noting
how "as much as eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor go unmet" and describing
how a mediator must remain neutral while acknowledging that an unrepresented litigant
"may give up rights without knowledge of the legal system"); see also Erica L. Fox, Note,
Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 91-92 (1996) (discussing the deleterious effects for an unrepresented
individual negotiating the resolution of a housing matter).
63. See Maltby, supra note 23, at 1-3 (enumerating the difficulties employees have in
obtaining legal representation). Maltby has continued to raise the concern about being
unable to obtain a lawyer as a potential reason to consider arbitration. See Lewis L. Maltby,
Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
29, 57 (1998) (highlighting the financial difficulties in finding representation).
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more than in the courts, as "[a]rbitration is much less expensive, allowing
attorneys to accept much smaller cases, in terms of the damages ....
There is no empirical support for this argument in employment
discrimination cases. 65 In contrast, while asserting that arbitration produces
better justice for employees than the courts produce, David Sherwyn and
co-authors J. Bruce Tracey and Zev J. Eigen have argued that lawyers are
not likely to represent employees in arbitrations because the plaintiffs' bar
has attacked the use of arbitration as coercive, and lawyers have little
economic incentive to take cases that go to arbitration.66 Until there is more
specific understanding and empirical evidence regarding the importance of
having legal representation for employees in arbitration, 7 there must be a
64. See Maltby, supra note 24, at 116.
65. Maltby does refer to an empirical study of 200 American Arbitration Association
cases as support for his claim. Id. See also Hill, supra note 24, at 804. However, that study
did not have a statistically significant number of employment discrimination cases to offer
any real input. Hill, supra note 24, at 805. Maltby used this same data set for general
employment claims to argue "by definition, half of any data set falls below the median, [so]
50% of the employment claims attorneys took to arbitration [in the Hill study] would not
have been filed in court." Maltby, supranote 24, at 116-17.
66. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 61, at 99-100 (asserting that because arbitration
reduces "the likelihood of settling" it "makes cases less attractive to profit-maximizing
plaintiffs' lawyers"); see also Bingham, supra note 59, at 198-201 (finding that experienced
lawyers are not likely to take arbitration cases representing highly paid employees due to the
fact that their recoveries are less than in court cases or cases representing lower paid
employees due to their lesser recovery on the whole and that "even less able" lawyers who
know there is less likelihood of settlement with arbitration cases will not take the case due to
the time investment even if there is less cost to try the case in arbitration).
67. See Bingham, supra note 59, at 198 (noting that "researchers have found that parties
fare better in labor arbitration when they have a lawyer and the other side does not" but
acknowledging that there is not enough data to make this assessment in employment
arbitration cases). However, in the later Elizabeth Hill study, the author asserted that the
impact of having an attorney in an employment arbitration proceeding had little effect as
unrepresented employees performed just as well as those with counsel. Hill, supra note 24,
at 818-19. Part of this result was attributed to the fairness of the American Arbitration
Association Procedures and the intellect of the employees involved. Id. at 819. I am
somewhat skeptical of this result which assumes that legal representation does not matter.
What supports my cynicism is that most of the disputes assessed were not employment
discrimination disputes. Id. at 805 (claiming that employment discrimination claims in the
sample were too small to be statistically significant). Arup Varma and Lamont Stallworth
conducted a limited empirical study about the effects of legal representation in mediation;
although their study focused on the perception of satisfaction by the participants depending
on whether they were represented by counsel. See Varma & Stallworth, supra note 56, at
395-417 (describing methodology for survey of participants who had voluntarily used
mediation to resolve their employment mediation disputes). While this information is
helpful regarding parties feelings about the selection and qualities of the mediator, to the
extent that parties chose to enter into mediation voluntarily with or without counsel
probably already reflected their feelings about the effect of having counsel participate. The
Varma and Stallworth study did not look at the results in terms of monetary awards and
resolutions with or without counsel in mediation or any form of ADR, which is an area that
still needs exploration. The few studies that have explored this issue of monetary awards in
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concerted focus on how to provide legal services to employees if these
disputes will continue to be resolved in arbitration.
In mediation, it is not clear just how much lawyers are participating."
But "lawyers often have an important role to play in protecting their clients
during the course of a mediation and ensuring that any agreement that is
reached is fair to the client or otherwise appropriate."'69 Vivian Berger, an
experienced employment mediator and law professor at Columbia Law
School, has recently highlighted the concerns about lack of legal
representation in mediation:
[Tihe company frequently profits from being a 'repeat player' in
mediation and from its ability to hire superior legal assistance.

An even more salient equalizer would be counsel for the
complainant. Thus, the company should allow the employee to
have an attorney represent him in the mediation session and any
related negotiations. Yet that minimalist approach does not help
the employee who wants, but cannot afford, a lawyer.7"
Similar to judges, many experienced neutrals acting as mediators or
arbitrators have struggled with the ethical implications that can occur in an
employment discrimination claim when the employee is unrepresented and
the employer has legal counsel.7' For those neutrals who are lawyers, new

mediation have noted a racial bias without addressing the effect of attorneys or lack of legal
counsel. See, e.g., LaFree & Rack, supra note 57, at 778-80 (describing findings concluding
that female and male claimants of color received less in mediation than similarly situated
white claimants in litigation based upon the actual percentages of the amounts obtained);
Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority BargainingPatterns in the
MetroCourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 211 (1999) (describing data from prior
studies and analyzing the disparate outcomes in bargaining for ethnic minorities, women
and those with limited bargaining power in mediation).
68. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to StructureAdvocacy in a NonadversarialSetting, 14 OHIO ST.
J.ON Disp. RESOL. 269, 269-70 & n.3 (1999) (asserting that "lawyers are frequently
accompanying their clients to mediation" but acknowledging that the "extent to which
lawyers attend mediations varies according to both the nature of the dispute and the culture
of the jurisdiction" and that "[1lawyers are far more likely to attend those mediations in
which a great deal is at stake than they are, for example, to attend mediations of small
claims type disputes").
69. Id. at 345.
70. Berger, supra note 58, at 533-35.
71. See David A. Hoffman & Natasha A. Affolder, Mediation and UPL: Do Mediators
Have a Well-Founded Fear of Prosecution?, 6 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 20 (2000) (discussing
potential implications for mediators of being prosecuted in some states for the unauthorized
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Rule 2.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct identifies some
ethical responsibilities for dealing with the unrepresented participant:
(a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer
assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to
reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen
between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include
service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as
will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.
(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform
unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party
does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer
shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a thirdparty neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client."
Beyond the ethical concerns about the practice of law and trying to get
the unrepresented claimant to seek counsel, if the neutral does too much to
help the unrepresented employee bridge the lack of legal representation
gap, the neutral will face the problem of being no longer perceived as
impartial by the employer.73 Because of the dilemma for a third party
neutral in dealing with an unrepresented employee, Lamont Stallworth, a
labor and employment arbitrator and mediator and a human resources
professor, has expressed serious concern about the "practical implications
related to claimants and plaintiffs representing themselves in mediation" of
an employment discrimination claim.74 At the center of this concern is the
"'imbalance of power' that might exist" and which could lead to the
unrepresented employee expecting the "mediator to 'level the playing field'
and provide legal advice."7 He also noted that although there is "no
systematic empirical study contrasting the difference in mediated
settlements in represented and unrepresented situations.... [i]t certainly
seems fair to hypothesize that an inexperienced claimant or plaintiff

practice of law when helping unrepresented litigants in mediation through evaluative
mediation or the drafting of settlement agreements).
72. See

MODEL

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

2.4

(2003),

available at

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule-2-4.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
73. See Berger, supra note 58, at 536 ("This type of asymmetry also creates difficulties
for the mediator" because "[i]f he attempts to compensate for the inequality by assisting the
employee, he risks the loss, real or perceived, of his neutrality" and "[d]espite disclaimers,
the worker will tend to see the neutral as her own attorney; and if the mediator is not careful,
so will the employer.").
74. See Lamont E. Stallworth, Finding a Place for Non-Lawyer Representation in
Mediation, 4 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 19, 19 (1997).

75. Id.
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generally will not 76fare well in mediation against an experienced
employment lawyer."
Stallworth's suggested solution to this dilemma is to allow nonlawyers to represent employees in mediation of employment disputes." For
example, he identified a "union representative, [a] civil rights advocacy
organization, friend or relative" as possible non-lawyers who may represent
the claimant."8

He also suggested that non-lawyer representatives may

come from the ranks of "third-year law students who are in clinical
mediation programs.

79

Historically, individuals in the traditional labor setting have been able
to handle the role of representation in arbitration and mediation
proceedings without raising unauthorized practice of law concerns."0 But
with the broad growth of ADR and its substitution for the courts,8' many
states have started to scrutinize the unauthorized practice of law question in
ADR proceedings.82
Any non-lawyers or even lawyers not authorized to practice law in a
particular state should seriously consider the ramifications before deciding
to represent individual employees with discrimination disputes in ADR. As
described in Part IV, this Article proposes that unions, and in particular
76. Id. at 20. See also Berger, supra note 58, at 500 (agreeing that an unrepresented
employee facing experienced counsel of an employer has "virtually no chance of victory").
77. Stallworth, supra note 74, at 19.
78. Id. He specifically referred to using non-lawyer members from "organized labor or
civil rights advocacy groups, such as the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Urban
League, Women Employed, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
disabilities organizations, etc." Id. at 20.
79. Id.
80. See Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney as Mediator - Inherent Conflict of
Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REv. 986, 1000-01 (1985) (describing cases where courts found that
the practice of industrial relations and the act of serving as a labor consultant to negotiate
and draft a collective bargaining agreement did not constitute the practice of law).
81. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a
Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 17 (2003) (describing the growth of
arbitration as a substitute for the courts and criticizing this substitution as being coerced by
companies as adhesion agreements rather than out in the open as a legal discussion of the
waiver of the right to a jury trial).
82. See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the Labor Act: Thoughts
on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Committees, 5 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 88 n.55 (2002) (identifying the issue of whether non-lawyer union
members representing individual employees in arbitration would raise unauthorized practice
of law concerns and suggesting the use of a legal service plan as a mechanism to circumvent
this problem); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 156-57 (1999) (discussing concerns about
unauthorized practice of law by mediators during a mediation proceeding); Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the ProfessionalMonopoly
from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 235, 256-58 (2002)
(describing and citing articles regarding the growing number of practitioner and academic
debates as to whether mediation involved the practice of law).
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black caucuses, coalitions and associations within those unions, can
establish legal service plans to assist individual employees in
discrimination disputes. Then the unauthorized practice of law concern
would not apply as the legal service plan would employ licensed attorneys
to represent the individual in the discrimination claim against the employer.
Given the significant need of employees for legal help in resolving their
disputes with employers and the vast skills that unions bring to bear, it is a
major opportunity area for unions to bridge the gap in legal representation.

III. A PRESSING NEED FOR UNIONS

TO STRIVE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE

Given its diminishing density, 3 organized labor must explore creative
ways to expand its membership. With increasing numbers of people of
color entering the workplace, the time is now for organized labor to
capitalize on the diversity of the increasing number of workers. A number
of commentators have explored the difficult dynamics for unions in
attempting to achieve racial justice given organized labor's poor civil rights
history.' Historically, many white male dominated unions in the twentieth
83. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1767,
1767-68 (2001) ("Labor union density has been declining since the 1950s.").
84. A symposium, "Activism and the Law: The Intersection of the Labor and Civil
Rights Movements," even explored the issue of coalitions with labor unions and community
organizations and generated a series of articles discussing coalitions between labor and civil
rights/community activist groups. See Susan Sturm, Introduction:Reconnecting Labor and
Civil Rights Advocacy, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 617 (2000). Those articles include:
Penda D. Hair, Prayer and Protest: Bringing a Community Vision of Justice to a Labor
Dispute, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 662 (2000) (describing a coalition between unions
and the religious community); Benjamin Hensler, Building a Coalitionfor Workers' Rights
at Kmart, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 687, 693 (2000) (explaining that race provided a lens
that highlighted the moral aspects of the struggle for the larger community); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, InstitutionalizingEconomic Justice: A LatCrit Perspective on the Imperatives of
Linking the Reconstruction of "Community" to the Transformation of Legal Structures that
Institutionalize the Depoliticization and Fragmentationof Labor/Community Solidarity, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 773 (2000) (contextualizing case studies in which effective
labor/community coalitions were indispensable to the success of union organizing and
collective bargaining efforts in a way that reflects some of the advances that currently are
converging in the Latino Critical Legal Theory movement); Reverend Nelson Johnson,
Reflections on an Attempt to Build "Authentic Community" in the GreensboroKmart Labor
Struggle, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675 (2000) (reflecting on the way the struggle at the
Kmart distribution center in Greensboro was defined to be one that involved the whole
community and not just the individuals that were directly affected); Martha R. Mahoney,
ConstructingSolidarity: Interest and White Workers, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 747 (2000)
(analyzing the intersection of class and whiteness); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Power of
Unlikely Coalitions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 737, 739 (2000) (describing various case
studies involving union-community coalitions, including the Janitors for Justice Program in
Los Angeles); Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohen, Organizingat the Intersection of Labor
and Civil Rights: A Case Study of New Haven, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 629, 629-30
(2000) (arguing that labor must focus on community-based organization in communities of
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century have openly discriminated on the basis of race."5 Those historical
actions, as well as recent acts of racism, affect unions, especially those
dominated by white males, in their dealings with black employees and the
civil rights and community-based groups that advocate for racial justice
today.
Also, group dynamics have impeded successful coalitions between
organized labor and black employees because organized labor has focused
on class justice whereas black employees have sought racial justice. 6
Navigating this race and class divide requires skill and commitment.87 In
color not only to increase membership but as a form of community-based activism). Other
authors have also discussed the parameters of coalitions with organized labor. See, e.g.,
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 75-82, 101-03 (2002) (describing problems while
advocating broad-based coalitions between whites and black workers); Leroy D. Clark,
Movements in Crisis: Employee-Owned Businesses-A Strategy for Coalition Between
Unions and Civil Rights Organizations,46 How. L.J. 49 (2002) (identifying the struggles in
creating coalitions between labor and civil rights movements and the problems they both
face).
85. See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four
Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patternsof Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 162 &
nn. 167-68 (2001) ("Up until the New Deal, and in some cases even after, unions widely
practiced overt exclusion of minorities, women and immigrants" and before then "almost all
labor unions engaged in race discrimination, ranging from complete exclusion to internal
segregation."); see also Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 277, 283-84, 298 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds.,
1993) (describing the exclusion of blacks from unions prior to passage of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color
at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 395, 404
(1993) (explaining the lack of fair representation for black firefighters prior to Steele v.
Louisville); Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial DiscriminationDecisions, 1935-1964: The
Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner Eye of Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 55, 5863 (1991) (describing the pervasive level of discrimination against blacks from 1935-64);
accord Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1339, 1346 (1997).
86. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1785-88 (describing the race and class
conflict and how the historical problems and conflicts with unions and civil rights groups
raises a concern, and questioning the resolve of organized labor to have a social justice
focus rather than a class focus given a recent effort by organized labor to "put aside race and
gender interests").
87. The general debate about race and class is a significant and complex one. Compare
TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS WRACKED BY
CULTURE WARS (1995) 223-37 (describing the careless use of energy related to focusing on
racial identity politics and the consequences of creating more divisions in our society
between the wealthy and the lower class and creating a political structure where white males
have no option than to rebel against identity) with ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS:
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS 25-43 (1994) (describing the
importance of dignity and empowerment through racial identity amongst black workers
which transcended into an overall value of race-consciousness for both black and white
members of the working class). Also, Professor Sheryll Cashin has recently explored in

2004]

RACIAL JUSTICE IN UNIONS

addition, some aspects of labor law create conflicts for organized labor
when dealing with individual employees who may seek racial justice.88
A.

Labor's Unremarkable Civil Rights History

Organized labor does not have a good civil rights record.89 From the
early 1900s, when black activist A. Philip Randolph organized the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters to address the concerns of black
railroad employees, unions and black workers have not necessarily worked
in concert to address civil rights.' Under a concept that has developed as a
matter of labor law, unions have a duty to fairly represent all employees.'
some depth the impact of segregation on race and class and highlighted the urgency of not
accepting our segregated society. Sheryll Cashin, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How
RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004). Because this is a debate
that could swallow the entire focus of this Article, I will only recognize the debate and
explore its implications within the limited situations posed by the thesis of this Article in
Part III.C. See Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1320-25
(2002) (describing how efforts by organized labor to organize and develop a colorblind class
ideology ignores the role of race in constructing class identity and how seeking a class focus
while seeking to deny the implications of race is merely perpetuation of white privilege and
economic oppression of blacks). Professor Crain has recently noted: "A law that severs race
and class oppression from one another does violence to workers' experience and produces
manifest injustice.... Insisting on a unity in which difference is erased only results in the
further exclusion of those who are different." Id. at 1341 (footnotes omitted). For a
thoughtful and more in-depth discussion of class and race, see Martha R. Mahoney, Class
and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 799 (2003) and Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuitof
Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995).
88. Crain, supra note 3, at 229-42 (describing doctrine adopted by the National Labor
Relations Board which originally was intended to find it unlawful to prevent employers
from making inflammatory racial appeals to divide workers and how that doctrine has been
expanded to ban appeals to racial pride by the union also so that the law now requires
colorblind organizing).
89. See generally Herbert Hill, The AFL-CIO and the Black Worker: Twenty-Five Years
After the Merger, 10 J. OF INTERGROUP REL. 5, 60 (1982) ("[T]he distribution of wealth and

income in the United States has not changed during the past twenty-five years" from 19551980 and the "AFL-CIO did not take the required action to eliminate racial discrimination
within its ranks, an issue the union leadership regarded mainly as a public relations problem
and 'handled' as such.").
90. See Steven H. Kropp, DeconstructingRacism in American Society-The Role Labor
Law Might Have Played (But Did Not) in Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial
Explanation and Historical Commentary, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 380, 384
(2002) (discussing early 1900s discrimination by labor against blacks by stating:
"Throughout the 1900's, the railroad craft unions practiced virulent racism [and] frequently
engaged in blatant forms of discrimination, often seeking to exclude African Americans
from employment altogether" while also describing how the railroad unions, "at least
through 1950, had terrible records on racial issues.").
91. The courts have attempted to address the concern about union conflicts and
improper acts that disadvantage certain employees on the basis of race under section 301 of
the Labor-Management Relations Act by requiring that a union owes a duty of fair
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The significance of enforcing this duty arose in the first half of the 1900s as
unions were notoriously effective in protecting the rights of white male
workers while openly discriminating against black male workers.92
When the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)93 was being
considered in the 1930s, it originally "included a clause prohibiting union
discrimination against Blacks," but "strong AFL resistance caused Senator
Wagner to eliminate the clause in order to secure organized labor's support
for the bill."94 However, many "Black leaders at the NAACP and the
National Urban League considered the clause essential to further Black
employment in unionized workplaces; since most union constitutions
denied union membership to Blacks, implementation of the closed shop
blocked access to Blacks."95 Unfortunately, "[wlhite leaders at the AFL
prioritized job protection and racial privilege for white members, taking the
position that they would prefer to see the entire statute defeated rather than
suffer the inclusion of an anti-discrimination clause."' 6 The NLRA passed

representation to all its members and that it may be sued by members for breaches of that
duty. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2004); see also James E. Jones, Jr., The Development of The Law
Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 24-28
(1976) (discussing the duty of fair representation in relationship to Title VII race
However, challenges to these breaches are limited by the
discrimination claims).
requirement that the Plaintiff prove the union's actions were arbitrary and capricious. See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (explaining arbitrary and capricious requirement and
how the judicially-created duty developed in response to a series of cases involving alleged
discrimination by unions against individual members on the basis of their race, as found in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)); see also Marion Crain &
Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1562-66 (1999) (describing the duty of fair representation and its
potential for exploiting black workers' rights to the exclusion of white male dominated
unions).
92. See Herbert Hill, Race and Ethnicity in Organized Labor: The HistoricalSources of
Resistance to Affirmative Action, 12 J. OF INTERGROUP REL. 5, 11 (1984) (describing early
1900s hostility to black workers by white immigrant-led unions and describing one writer's
assessment of the discrimination in a black journal in 1902 that "labor unions constituted 'a
gigantic closed corporation-a greedy, grasping, ruthless, intolerant, overbearing, dictatorial
combination of half-educated white men."). The "white worker and his trade union
displaced black labor on the street railways, removed Afro-American firemen on railroads,
took the jobs of black switchmen and shop workers, replaced blacks in construction work
and shipbuilding and forced them out of tobacco manufacturing and other industries" and
when "employers wished to hire blacks, white workers frequently protested" so that
"[b]etween 1882 and 1900 there were at least fifty strikes by whites against the hiring of
blacks." Id. at 19-20.
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2004).
94. Crain, supra note 3, at 229; see also id. at 229-30 & n. 106 (describing the history of
the NLRA, also called the Wagner Act after its main proponent, Senator Wagner, and citing
David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-FaireJurisprudence
and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 85, 95 (1993)).
95. Id. at 229-30.
96. Id. at 230.
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without the clause. 97

When Title VII arrived in the 1960s, it led to a workplace revolution
by ushering in a focus on individual rights instead of collective rights. 98
Under the individual rights model, claims are filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) rather than with a
union representative, and today federal statutes protect workers
from discrimination based on race, gender, national origin,
religion, age, and disability-the very categories around which
identity groups are often formed. 99
Organized labor did not play a major supporting role in getting Title VII
passed, and it has not led the efforts to improve Title VII through
amendments."°
Specifically, Title VII included unions along with
employers as the entities to be regulated and banned them both from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race.' Because of labor's
spotty civil rights record, the march for racial justice in the workplace has
continued without organized labor playing a leading role." 2
97. Id.
98. Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1781-82 (describing the development of antidiscrimination laws in response to labor law's failure to respond to identity politics);
McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1351 (finding that "federal law effectively encouraged
employees to define their grievances at the workplace, and to organize themselves, through
reference to personal or group identity rather than through a union.").
99. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1351.
100. See Hill, supra note 89, at 35 (noting: that leadership of the AFL-CIO did not
actively support proposals for Title VII; that the AFL-CIO was not part of the national
coalition that emerged to sponsor the 1963 March on Washington even though it was
coordinated by labor leader, A. Philip Randolph, and although the United Auto Workers
with its substantial black membership did participate; and that once it became necessary to
testify in front of Congress about the pending Title VII legislation in 1964, AFL-CIO
President George Meany begrudgingly supported it and said it was necessary because the
AFL-CIO was helpless to stop union discrimination as its organization operated in a
democratic way and could not impose its will on union dues payers). Similarly, after Title
VII passed, unions challenged it based upon application of seniority provisions in union
contracts and sometimes entered into court battles against its own black members. Id. at 38,
53. Also, when the opportunity came to amend Title VII in 1972 and give the EEOC more
power, organized labor fought it and successfully stopped efforts to give the EEOC
authority to issue cease and desist orders. As a result, the EEOC was only allowed to file a
private suit for enforcement instead. Id. at 53-54.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (2004) (making it illegal for labor organizations to
discriminate).
102. See David L. Gregory, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 680, 691 n.71 (1985) (reviewing
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984) and MORGAN 0.
REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: LABOR UNIONS IN AMERICA (1984)) (describing how

unions have deliberately perpetuated racial discrimination, in some instances). See also
William B. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 40, 40 (1969) (describing how Title VII was necessary because of union
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B. Labor's Recent Racial Concerns: Reverse Discrimination vs.
Affirmative Action
Once Title VII became effective and banned race discrimination in the
workplace, the effects of the historical and still present union-based
discrimination created concerns for employers. In response to the law, or
as a result of lawsuits filed pursuant to the law, employers adopted
affirmative action plans to correct past discriminatory practices. The
historical perspective and any concerns about perpetuating the racism of
the past would seem to support efforts to achieve a racial balance in the
workplace that resembles the communities in which employees work.
However, if unions take on the concerns of affirmative action, their
majority constituencies will likely view it as coming "at the expense of
senior nonminority males." ' 3 This would lead to what has been referred to
as "reverse discrimination" claims, where white males sue employers for
taking measures to respond to and improve racial justice in their
workplaces."° David Schwartz has explained this form of lawsuit:
Reverse discrimination cases have arisen in three situations.
First, a white (or male) employee or applicant complains that a
minority (or female) employee or applicant received preferential
treatment on the basis of race or gender pursuant to a voluntary
affirmative action plan. In a second setting, typically in
employment, a white/male employee challenges involuntary
affirmative action: a court-ordered remedy that results in some
preferential treatment to compensate minority/female employees
for judicially proven discrimination. In both instances, the
question of race- or sex-based decision making - usually the crux
of dispute in most discrimination cases - is undisputed. The
reverse discrimination claim is thus a challenge to the affirmative
action plan. In a third setting, the complaining white/male
employee alleges only that the minority/female employee was
treated more favorably; there is not necessarily an affirmative
failures).
103. Gregory, supra note 102, at 691 n.72 (highlighting the significant tension between
union seniority systems and affirmative action principles).
104. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different Means the Same: Applying a Different
Standard of Proofto White Plaintiffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 53-54 & n.3 (1999) (defining "reverse discrimination" as
"discrimination against persons belonging to groups that have traditionally been privileged
by their race and/or sex ... " and finding that "[w]hile only 16 percent of white individuals
claim to know someone who has been the victim of reverse discrimination, more than 70
percent of Whites are convinced that reverse discrimination is a rampant problem.").
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action plan or even a 'benign' motivation.' 5
To the extent reverse discrimination cases have developed, James
Jones "has traced the origin of the term 'reverse discrimination' to some
marginally relevant dicta in very early Title VII cases in the lower courts"
that used the term to "express concern for the impact of discrimination
remedies on existing seniority rights of white employees."" "Thus, a
seniority system launched when... people of color were systematically
excluded from the competition for particular jobs later became the
institutionalized mechanism whereby white men were granted continued
racial... privilege."'"1 Accordingly, racial conflicts regarding affirmative
action principles and traditional seniority systems for white males have
created a significant dilemma in employment discrimination law,
particularly as the law relates to black employees represented by unions.
1. Private Sector: Weber and its Progeny
The Supreme Court has deferred to the union seniority system over
affirmative action and employment discrimination concerns in many
instances. 8 In one major case, the Court did not defer to seniority when it
was used to try to attack an affirmative action plan. It is not surprising that
the leading Supreme Court case on affirmative action under Title VII,
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber," arose because of problems
where craft unions had historically discriminated against blacks."' The
Court stated that "[j]udicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial
105. David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections on
Reverse Discrimination,Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 Wisc. L. REv. 657,
662 (footnotes and citations omitted).
106. Id. at 662 n.13 (citing James E. Jones, Jr., "Reverse Discrimination" in
Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action Programs in the United States, 25
How. L.J. 217, 224-25 (1982)).
107. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1347-48.
108. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S 391,403-404 (2002) (finding that a
company-imposed seniority system normally takes precedence over any accommodations
required by federal law banning employment discrimination on the basis of disability); W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 767
(1983) (finding that Title VII and collective bargaining do not conflict with each other); see
also David L. Gregory, Conflict Between Seniority and Affirmative Action Principles in
Labor Arbitration, and Consequent Problems of JudicialReview, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 54-55
(1984) (discussing conflicts with affirmative action and union seniority). Also, the Supreme
Court has recognized that seniority systems are generally protected from challenge under
Title VII through the statutory exception for bona fide seniority systems. See Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 (1977). This bona fide seniority system
exception can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2004).
109. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
110. Id. at 198 &n.1.
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grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for
judicial notice."'..
The result from the case was positive in terms of
achieving justice for black workers who had historically been denied
certain jobs by allowing the employer and the union to agree to rectify the
situation through an affirmative action plan.
In Weber, Kaiser Aluminum entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Steelworkers of America Union (USWA) that
established an affirmative action plan for the employees at fifteen of
Kaiser's plants in 1974."' Brian Weber, a white male, worked at one of
those plants in Gramercy, Louisiana. "' The intent of the plan was to
remedy the effects of the craft union discrimination which had led to the
almost exclusively white skilled craft workforce at Kaiser with only 1.83%
(5 out of 273) of the craft workers being black at the Gramercy plant.1"
The affirmative action plan provided that Kaiser would no longer hire
experienced craftsmen to fill vacant craft positions because those craftsmen
had to get their experience from outside craft unions that had
discriminatory practices." 5 Instead, Kaiser created a training program to
develop its own craft workers from a pool of its own production
employees." 6 Trainees were selected for the craft program based on
seniority as long as fifty-percent of those selected for the training were
black. "' This fifty-percent black requirement for the training program was
intended to increase the pool of black craft workers from only 1.83% until
it approximated thirty-nine percent, the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force for the Gramercy area."' When thirteen craft trainees were
selected from Gramercy's production workforce in 1974, seven of them
were black and six were white."9
However, the "most senior black selected into the program had less
seniority than several white production workers whose bids for admission
were rejected [including that of Brian Weber.]"'2 Weber subsequently
111. Id. (citing to studies along with the following cases: United States v. Int'l Union of
Elevator Constructors, Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Associated Gen. Contractors
of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973); Southern I11.
Builders Ass'n v.
Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971); Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 53 v. Ogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969); Buckler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd without opinion, 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973)).
112. 443 U.S. at 198.
113. Id. at 199.
114. Id. at 198.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 199.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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filed a class action claim under Title VII on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated white employees. 2' He alleged that the affirmative action
program had resulted in junior black employees receiving the craft training
in preference to senior white employees, which discriminated against the
white employees on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 2
In finding that discrimination under Title VII had not occurred in
Weber, the Court noted that its decision did not encompass an alleged
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because this was a private matter with no state actors.' 23 Also, because the
affirmative action plan was voluntarily adopted by the employer and the
union, as opposed to being a court ordered remedy for past violations, the
Court limited its inquiry to "whether Title VII forbids private employers
and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action
plans that accord racial preferences 24in the manner and for the purpose
provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."'
The intent of Title VII, as shown in the legislative history through the
remarks of the Congressmen involved, was to address "the plight of the
Negro in our economy," and the fact that "[t]he rate of Negro
unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with white
unemployment for the past 15 years.... is one of the principal reasons why
The law contains no prohibition on allowing the
the bill [passed]." '
private sector to take effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress
had hoped Title VII would achieve through the voluntary adoption of
affirmative action plans to rectify discrimination in the workplace. Instead,
the Court found that Title VII was "intended as a spur or catalyst to cause
'employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history.'""26
In addressing the parameters under which race-conscious affirmative
action plans are permissible or impermissible, the Court acknowledged that
the Kaiser-USWA plan was a permissible plan.'27 It was permissible
because "[t]he purposes of the plan mirror those of the [Title VII] statute"
as it was designed "to break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy" and "open employment opportunities for Negroes in

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 200 (original emphasis).
125. Id. at 202 (quoting remarks of Senator Humphrey and Senator Clark in the
Congressional Record related to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
126. Id. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
127. Id. at 208.
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occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."'2 8 The Court
also found that "the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees" because it "does not require the discharge of white
workers and their replacement with new black hirees."'' 9 Furthermore, the
plan did not "create an absolute bar to advancement of white employees"
30
because "half of those trained in the program will be white."'1
Finally, the Court found that "the plan is a temporary measure... not
intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest
racial imbalance" because after the percentage of black skilled craftworkers
in the workforce at the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of
blacks in the Gramercy labor force, the preferential selection under the
affirmative action plan would end.13' Thus, the white males used seniority
to create a wedge between the employer's and the union's efforts to rectify
the historical discrimination in the craft positions at Kaiser. This so-called
reverse discrimination claim highlights the parameters for challenging an
affirmative action plan as a mechanism to discriminate against whites on
3
the basis of their race. 1
All employers and unions seeking to achieve racial justice by adopting
race-conscious affirmative action plans should require that the plan: (1) be
intended to correct a manifest racial imbalance in the workplace by either
breaking down old patterns of segregation or hierarchy, or by opening up
employment opportunities to those who have been traditionally closed out
of these opportunities based on race; (2) be structured to guarantee that the
interests of the white employees are not unnecessarily trammeled through
creation of absolute bars to advancement or selection for white employees;
and (3) be temporary and designed to last only as long as necessary to
correct a manifest racial imbalance, and not be a permanent effort to
maintain a specific racial make-up in the workforce.
Despite the pervasive divisions in our country about race, affirmative
action still remains a viable mechanism under Title VII for private
employers to remedy the effects of discrimination in the workplace.'33 The
issue for unions with majority white male memberships is that they see no
reason to agree to an affirmative action plan and will likely view such a

128. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Schwartz, supra note 105, at 657 ("While the notion that we are all in one big
protected group, safe from discrimination, sounds comforting, what it really means is that
white males can bring 'reverse discrimination' cases and that 'reverse civil rights' lawyers
are on the ascendancy in attacking affirmative action.").
133. The application of Weber to affirmative action plans based on gender was later
confirmed. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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plan as reverse discrimination.'
In the private sector, the mechanism to
prevent the union from agreeing to pursue affirmative action is to sue the
union under Title VII as the plaintiffs did in Weber. The more likely option
for the white male majority in a union is to use its majority power voting
bloc to prevent the union from even agreeing to affirmative action in the
first instance. Then the union may use the resources of its dues-paying
members, including black members, to challenge an employer's personnel
actions made pursuant to an affirmative action plan.
2. Public Sector: Wygant, Grutter,and the Chicago Firefighters
"Today the highest rates of unionization in the public sector are in
local government employment (43.2 percent in 2001), with police, teachers,
and firefighters leading the way.' 35 In the public sector, employers are
subject to the additional constitutional concerns posed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As became evident in the
Supreme Court's decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, an
affirmative action plan involving a public employer is subject to strict
scrutiny pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.'36 In
Wygant, the union brought suit against the employer school board because
the board had not followed the affirmative action plan contained in the
collective bargaining agreement. That plan allowed black teachers to be
retained over white teachers with more seniority, and it was intended to
remedy societal discrimination based on the need for black role models as
teachers.'37 The Supreme Court under its strict scrutiny analysis rejected
that as a compelling interest and denied the use of the race-conscious plan
in Wygant.'38
However, when considering its most recent decisions regarding
affirmative action and the Equal Protection Clause in Grutterv. Bollinger'
and Gratz v. Bollinger,"4 the Supreme Court received substantial and
134. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1348-49 ("Unions... frequently opposed
affirmative action plans.").
135.

JOSEPH

E.

SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,

1900-1962, 10 & n.25 (2004).
136. 476 U.S. 267, 271 (1986).
137. Id. at 270-71.
138. Id. at 284.
139. 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action policy was valid and that its use to improve racial diversity in public
universities was a compelling interest warranting a legitimate consideration within the scope
of the Equal Protection Clause as long as it is not the sole factor).
140. 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's undergraduate
affirmative action policy was unconstitutional in that it placed considerations of race above
a sufficient and individualized manner of selection of candidates as is necessary under the
Equal Protection Clause).
AND THE STATE,
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significant evidence from key businesses, educational institutions, and the
military asserting that affirmative actions programs are necessary in
attracting customers, workers, and military leaders. 4' With greater
numbers of people of color entering the schools, the military, and the
workplace, the constituencies for unions and the customers and
communities they serve will all demand that unions play a major role in
racial justice.
Even recently some public sector unions have become plagued with
schisms over racial issues. The prospect of affirmative action has led to
some very heated debates in the public sector in "a country where
approximately twenty-one million people work for public sector entities"
and "37.4% of public sector workers are union members."'4 2 Police and
firefighter unions have been at the forefront of a number of challenges to
affirmative action plans as being so-called reverse discrimination on the
basis of race. 43 Considering the racial diversity in communities that many
firefighters and police officers serve, it has become incumbent upon their
unions to balance the needs of majority white members with the need to
improve community race relations.
"[W]hen Title VII was applied to state and local governments in 1972,
it pried open police and fire departments across the country-among the
most notorious public bastions of white privilege-for working class
African Americans.'"" Firefighters and police officers have brought a
large number of reverse discrimination cases challenging affirmative action

141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-331 (stating that "American businesses have made clear
that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints" and noting that
"[hligh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military" had
argued that a "'racially diverse officers corps . .. is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principle mission to provide national security."') (quoting Brief for Julius W.
Becton, Jr., et al., Amicus Curiae 27).
142. Vijay Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why It Should Matter to the Public
and to Academia, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401,401 (2003).
143. See generally Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse or Majority
Race or National Origin Discrimination Violative of Federal Constitution or StatutesPublic Employment Cases, 168 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2001) at §§ 3, 7, 8[b]-10[a], 12 (describing
reverse discrimination cases involving firefighters), and at §§ 35[b], 7, 9, 10[b], 11 [a], 12[a],
13[b], 14a (describing reverse discrimination cases involving police and law enforcement
employees); see also Cynthia L. Fountaine, Due Process and the Impermissible Collateral
Attack Rule in Employment DiscriminationCases: An Analysis of Section 108 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 58 U. Pirr. L. REV. 435,436-43 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), which allowed white firefighters filing a
reverse discrimination claim against the City of Birmingham to challenge an affirmative
action plan that resulted as part of a consent decree agreement entered into by the City in
response to earlier discrimination litigation brought by black employees).
144. BROWNETAL., supra note 3, at 187.
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efforts in the workplace. 4 5 Many of these suits have been led by or
supported by unions or associations despite the presence of a number of
black and Hispanic members.
The racial divisions among some members of public sector firefighter
and police unions and the effect on the communities they serve is
highlighted by a recent example involving firefighters in the city of
Chicago. Known for its predominantly white staffing and detailed history
of racism,' 6 racial tensions in the Chicago Fire Department reached a
145. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (finding that City of Birmingham
white firefighters could challenge enforcement of affirmative action consent decree); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (finding affirmative action order did not
unnecessarily trammel on the rights of non-minority police troopers); Petit v. Chicago, 352
F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting individual white police officer's argument by applying
Grutter and concluding that their Union's collective bargaining agreement with the City did
not prohibit the affirmative action promotions); Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Dallas, 150
F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998) (challenging implementation of affirmative action plan on behalf of
white and Native American firefighters who had been passed over for promotions);
Alexander v. Estepp, 95 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding against a county's discriminatory
firefighter hiring practices); Aiken v. Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing
Memphis police and fire departments and deciding that summary judgment in favor of
defendant was improper because there was an issue of material fact as to whether the policy
of favoring racial minorities was narrowly tailored); Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993
F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that affirmative action programs must present more than
just a general history of societal discrimination and must specify the racial discrimination it
is targeting to be valid); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 979
F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding in favor of the city in a reverse discrimination suit by
police union because the affirmative action policy in question was remedial in nature);
Barfus v. Miami, 936 F.2d 1182 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing firefighters and police officer to
bring a suit for reverse discrimination); see also Debra Baker, Backdraft, 86 A.B.A. J. 48,
49-51 (Apr. 2000) (describing lawsuits filed by police and firefighters challenging
affirmative action plans, charting developments to end affirmative action consent decrees
within: the fire and police departments in Greenwood, Mississippi, the Boston Police
Department, the Pennsylvania State Police Department, the Miami Police Department, the
San Francisco Fire and Police Departments; and the New Orleans Police Department, while
noting that "the strongest opponents of [affirmative action] consent decrees are unions" and
highlighting the concerns of San Francisco's black fire chief that his efforts to continue to
attract qualified black candidates had made him the target of unions).
146. Andrew Martin, U.S.: Race Bias Still Rules in Fire Department, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6,
1998, at 1 ("City officials readily admit there was blatant discrimination at the Chicago Fire
Department for decades."); James Hill & Andrew Martin, Color Still Defines Chicago's
Firehouse: A Culture of Racism Divides Firefighters, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1998, METRO
SECT., at 1. See also John Eig, White Heat, 47 CHI. MAG. 80 (May 1998) (describing two
decades of attempts at affirmative action and how white firefighters still predominate but
claim they are being discriminated against in the Chicago Fire Department).
Difficulties for blacks in Chicago unions are not limited to the fire department or
public sector unions. See T. Shawn Taylor, Blacks Find Progress Slow in Joining Trade
Unions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1,2004, at 1 (finding that "[d]espite government efforts and court
orders to diversify unions dating back to the 1960s, blacks have made only halting progress
in Chicago's trade unions and in some cases have lost ground" because "[flor years, trade
unions functioned like whites-only fraternal organizations where insiders helped ease the
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fevered pitch in March 2004 as a result of "a spate of radio transmissions
over department frequencies" involving repeated racial slurs.'47 This
controversy started February 2, 2004 when firefighter John Scheuneman
allegedly made comments involving racial epithets.'
Scheuneman worked
in a predominantly black neighborhood in Chicago.' 49 He was transferred
out of his firehouse as a result of the incident.5 ' He "allegedly made racial
slurs directed at an African-American motorist he encountered in traffic."''
Those slurs "were broadcast over a [fire] department vehicle's radio that
was inadvertently left open to transmit."'52 The "firefighter received a 90day suspension in that incident, but those responsible for slurs broadcast in
five subsequent transmissions have not been found."'53
In response to the failure of the Fire Department to discover the source
of these continuing racial slurs over department frequencies, the Chicago
Tribune editorial page published a cartoon showing three firefighters
flushing their hoses on the backs of three black men who were pressed up
against a wall when another firefighter approaches and says, "No, guysthe fire's over there!"' 54 Chicago Mayor Richard Daley criticized the
cartoon as focusing on the bad acts of a few."'5 The public editor of the
Chicago Tribune, Don Wycliff, explained that the cartoon did highlight
some of the racial realities going on in Chicago regarding its firefighters
while noting that the problem is probably limited to a "few... but it
doesn't take many to poison a city's atmosphere and corrode public
confidence in the services they deliver.' 5 6
Tensions were exacerbated when Nicholas Russell, the head of an
association and caucus of black firefighters called the African American
League, received a death threat.'57 Also, the Fire Department discovered an
unofficial firefighters' web site that contained racist epithets.'58
In
way for certain applicants.").
147. Gary Washburn, Daley Blasts Editorial Cartoon:Apology Sought for Firefighters,
CHI. Tam., Mar. 18, 2004, METRO SECT., at 7.
148. Gary Washburn & Dan Mihalopoulos, 3rd Slur Heard Over Fire Radio: Alderman
Says She Received HarassingCall, CHI. TRIB. Mar. 2, 2004, METRO SECT., at 1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Gary Washburn, Joyce, Ministers Vow to Ease Rift From Slurs: Ward Meetings
Being Considered,CHI. TRIt., Mar. 19, 2004, METRO SECT., at 1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Washburn, supra note 147, at 7.
155. Id.
156. Don Wycliff, Did Marlette Cartoon Capture or Distort Chicago's Racial Reality?,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2004, § 1, at 27 (discussing analysis of the cartoon and the "number of
letters that have come from white Chicago firefighters and their families" in protest of the
cartoon).
157. Jeffers, supra note 1, at 1, 19.
158. Gary Washburn & Glenn Jeffers, City Tries to Shut Off Web Site: Firefighter Chat
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response, Russell stated:
The atmosphere [for blacks] is, "We don't like you."

[Therefore, out of fear of retaliation], "I can't ask a recent [black]
guy coming out of the academy to put himself in harm's way....
That's why I'm more willing to speak. If I don't get another
promotion, I just don't get another promotion."

"I'm sure the white guy who Jackie Robinson replaced was
'
upset."159

The Fire Commissioner at the time, James Joyce, supported meetings
with local residents and firefighters to bridge the gap between them "in the
wake of a series of racially offensive transmissions over Fire Department
radio frequencies."'"
Joyce attempted unsuccessfully to discover the
source of the other transmissions as the Fire Union President, James
McNally, a devout opponent of affirmative action, asserted that black
firefighters might have been behind the racist broadcasts. 6 ' In response to
Union President McNally's allegations, a number of community leaders
protested and "[m]any black firefighters also criticized McNally's past
insensitivity to black firefighters, which included showing up in the late
1980s at a firehouse in blackface to protest affirmative action." '62
Many of Chicago's firefighters of color have "also denounced the
union's use of the member dues, including those from black firefighters, to
pay for lawsuits that fight affirmative-action promotions."' 63 As Lieutenant
Annette Nance-Holt, a thirteen-year veteran and black firefighter recently
explained: "'If you're going to use my money against me, you should take
' 64
some of my money and put it in escrow so I can use it to sue you.
Likewise, Lieutenant Charles Vazquez, a Hispanic, stated: "'They [the
white union leadership] use our money [union dues] to fight us [and our
promotions in court]' ... 'It makes you mad, but they're in the majority.
Room Called "Hateful", CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2004, at 13.
159. Jeffers, supra note 1, at 1, 19.
160. See Washburn, supra note 151, at 3.
161. See Glenn Jeffers, Fire Union Chief Challenged: Protesters Blast McNally's Doubt
Over Radio Slurs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 2004, METRO SECT., at 1.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Even if every Hispanic and black banded together, it wouldn't make a dent
in the [union] electorate."" 65 Nevertheless, McNally views union efforts to
combat affirmative action as the fair way to prevent discrimination against
white firefighters.'66
Operating under this climate, on April 2, 2004, Mayor Daley
announced the retirement of Joyce, a white male, and introduced his
replacement, a black male, Cortez Trotter, as the new Commissioner of the
Chicago Fire Department.'67

Trotter vowed to "work aggressively to

diversify the department with qualified people of all races and genders" and
"serve notice to those who wrongfully believe the department is a haven for
small-mindedness, offensive behavior and stagnation. ' The Chicago Fire
Department represents a key and present example of how race matters for
unions and how the failure to embrace racial justice has not only caused
problems for the relationship between the union and its black members, but
also the relationship with black members of the public communities that
they serve.
C.

Dissecting the Race and Class Divide
The AFL-CIO's focus on class consciousness has unfortunately

ignored the effect of racism's impact on class.'69 Although organized labor

has touted coalitions with civil rights groups, its focus has been on
economic solidarity rather than racial justice. 7 ' In a key example of this
approach in 1995, then newly-elected President of the AFL-CIO, John
Sweeney, in addressing worker issues for unions, stated:
[A] union has to find a way to bring together all workers. That
means putting aside anything divisive or offensive and making
appeals that are unifying. Once working people understand that
the only way to protect their paychecks is to stand together,
they're likely to look past their prejudices to their shared
goals.... [S]uccessful organizers and union leaders must find
ways to emphasize the things that unite us, not divide us.'7'

165. Jeffers, supra note 1, at 1, 19.
166. Id.
167. See Gary Washburn, Joyce Exits: Daley Taps 1st Black Chief; New Leader Lays
Down Law, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2004, at 1.
168. Id.
169. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1768-69 & nn. 4 & 103 (describing the
AFL-CIO's and its President John Sweeney's focus on class).
170. Id. at 1786-87.
171. Id. at 1787 & n.118 (quoting from JOHN J. SWEENEY, AMERICA NEEDS A RAISE:
FIGHTING FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE at 58, 153 (1996)).
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When adopting this form of paycheck-only focus, any attempt to
acknowledge race as a possible problem for workers is met with a response
that race should not matter. Efforts to raise racial implications are
considered divisive and fall under the derogatory label of "playing the race
card," as if raising concerns about race represents an attempt by those of
color to obtain unwarranted and undeserved benefits at the expense of
white males.'
Even with organized labor's current leadership deciding to focus on
organizing and being more inclusive, the race and class divide continues to
represent a major obstacle to unions being able to play a more active role in
achieving racial justice in the workplace.'73 Some employers and others
with conservative agendas aimed at preventing the rise of unions and racial
justice in the workplace are quite happy to keep organized labor and their
black employees at loggerheads. This approach of divide and conquer
based on race and class has worked for years. 4
As early as the 1600s, employers in America used race to divide
workers seeking to band together on class issues.'75 As one commentator
put it in looking at the development of racism through slavery in the
colonial beginnings of Virginia and dealing with the poor English who
migrated to America at that time: "[Flor those with eyes to see, there was
an obvious lesson .... Resentment of an alien race might be more powerful
than resentment of an upper class. For men bent on the maximum
exploitation of labor the implication should have been clear."' 76 This
resembles "Orthodox Marxist theory[, which] views racism as an
instrument of the capitalist class, intended to divide the working classes of
blacks and whites through 'superexploiting' black workers, diminishing the
172. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing A Pro-Active Defense
of Affirmative Action, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 196 (1999) (discussing the offensiveness of

equating the negative use of race by referring to it as "playing race cards" and then using the
playing cards metaphor to analyze the affirmative action debate). Even when the CIO
unions first started to organize more black workers, it encouraged them to deny their race
and forget about being "advocates" for those who suffered racial discrimination even though
they were union dues paying members. Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1779.
173. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1788-1802 (discussing labor law doctrines
that limit union identity and direct organized labor's focus away from racial justice issues
and towards economic, worksite-specific organization and representation); George Feldman,
Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. &

LAB. L. 187, 201 (1994) (describing how labor law limits organized labor's efforts to go
beyond class conflict).
174. See Crain, supra note 3, at 258 & n.248 (noting the implications of "divide and
conquer" strategies by employers even recently involving a labor dispute of Kmart workers
in Greensboro, North Carolina where race was allegedly used to try to break the solidarity of
workers seeking class and wage improvements). See generallyRogers, supra note 7.
175.

See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL

OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 269-70 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975).

176. Id.
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bargaining power of white workers, and frustrating the development of a
united working class consciousness."' 77
Twenty-five years ago, William Julius Wilson, a noted black
sociologist, claimed that "changes in the structure of the American
economy" had created a "growing class division among blacks in which
economic class is now of greater importance than race in determining
individual black opportunities and life style."'' More recently, a labor and
employment law professor, Marion Crain, sometimes with her co-author,
Ken Matheny, and sometimes by herself, has explored the class and race
divide that engulfs organized labor today and excoriated organized labor
for its failure to embrace racial justice.'79 Crain does not blame organized
labor solely, however, and she has expressed concern that "some may view
[her] focus on labor's internal discord as divisive of solidarity and disloyal
to the goals of the labor movement." 80
' She has explained that her critiques
do not seek to place blame on unions or organized workers, but to
explore how the structure of the labor market, the operation of
race- and gender-privilege, the dynamics of the relation between
organized labor and employers, and the labor laws have
functioned both to keep less-privileged workers on the economic
periphery and to undermine the union power. 8'
177. Calmore, supra note 45, at 210-11 & n. 49 (quoting WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 5
(1978)) (describing this "Marxist explanation as consistent with the race relations of the
antebellum South and its racial caste system"). The other economic theory that explains this
division between race and class is a split market theory. Id. (describing William Julius
Wilson's discussion of the Marxist and split-market theories regarding race and class).
Professor Marion Crain and Ken Matheny have referred to the two theories as dual labor
and split labor. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 91, at 1574-77. Whichever theory
applies, the general understanding remains that race and class dynamics allow employers to
pit organized labor against individual workers of color. Id. at 1577.
178. Calmore, supra note 45, at 203 n.15 (citing WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

(1978)).
179. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 87; Crain, supra note 3; Crain & Matheny, supra note
83; Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Making Labor's Rhetoric Reality, 5 GREEN BAG 2D. 17
(2001).
180. Crain & Matheny, supra note 91, at 1544 n.6.
181. Id. Professor Crain said this in a 1999 article, id., and then she published articles in
2001 and 2002 which continued to criticize organized labor's focus on class justice while
diminishing its efforts at obtaining racial justice. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 87; Crain,
supra note 3; Crain & Matheny, supra note 83; Crain & Matheny, supra note 179. Similar
to Professor Crain, this Article's discussion of labor's poor history of race relations, its
continued focus on class with the exclusion of race issues as divisive, and the actions of
some unions in challenging affirmative action merely highlights the urgency of labor's need
for a racial justice response and does not seek to place blame on organized labor, but instead
seeks a solution to the current divisions.
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Regardless of her concerns about being disloyal to the goals of the
labor movement, Crain's work has added tremendous new sources of
analysis that include an indictment of labor's failing efforts at embracing
racial justice as a goal, while still trying to find ways to change these
results. Crain has also identified that even top black officials within
organized labor are concerned about integrating blacks into the equation:
Bill Fletcher, an African-American who serves as an assistant to
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, explained the nuances of
labor's ambivalent involvement in racial issues during an
interview.... Asked whether he is happy with how the labor
movement is dealing with issues of race, Fletcher responded:
[Black workers are] 'not just supporting what someone else is
doing. We need to be at the table. African-Americans, Latinos,
Asians, gays and lesbians, women-we all need to be at the table
when decisions are being made because we need to reshape the
labor movement.... A lot of people are going to be shaken by
this. Many leaders are comfortable with the idea of more people
of color coming into their movement. But they're not so
comfortable with the idea that maybe we're going to reorganize
things." 82
The problem is how to approach the joint issues of race and class
without subordinating either side's agenda. This presents a major concern
for union leadership. When a majority of the members of a union are white
workers, they may view efforts by their union leadership to achieve racial
justice (possibly through support of affirmative action in the workplace) as
against their interests, especially in a declining economy where jobs are at a
Those white members may feel that their agenda of
premium.
class/paycheck justice is being subsumed by a racial agenda. Also, they
may view this as a direct threat to their own economic and job security.
Likewise, black employees seeking the collective support from their
unions can feel subjugated by union efforts to deny their racial justice
issues. 3 Unions seek this denial under the guise of focusing on improved
wages for all as an agenda and while union leadership tells them that race
should not matter. Black employees are asked to deny their identity or
reduce any focus on racial identity in an effort to support union aims at
182. Crain, supra note 87, at 1333 n.119.
183. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1340 (discussing "the need for separation or
isolation from the larger group as a way of preserving one's identity or at least of not
subverting one's interests to those of the larger group"); see also GUINIER & TORRES, supra
note 84, at 102 (describing the need for race consciousness in organizing while not blaming
white workers).
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achieving class justice through the prism of colorblindness."8
Colorblindness constitutes to some "an absolute imperative, prohibiting
race-conscious decision-making in all but the most dire circumstances."' 85
Accordingly, colorblind analysis is based on "disregarding or
minimizing-'whitewashing' if you will-historic consequence," and
thereby it perpetrates a "new racism" based on a "perverted confirmation"
that individuals have a need to believe that this is a just world and people
get what they deserve to get. 86 This approach not only ignores current
effects from and efforts aimed at intentional discrimination, but it refuses to
address the aspect of unthinking, unconscious or unintended discrimination
that occurs.'87
This colorblind approach is occurring at a time when most empirical
data shows that race still matters in how people are treated in the United
States workplace, including the existence of a significant disparity in wages
based on race.' 8 A recent report by the National Urban League indicated
that the mean income of black males is seventy percent the mean income of
white males, with a $16,876 gap. Other factors to consider in this overall
class and race divide include: fewer than fifty percent of black families
own their home as opposed to seventy percent of whites; blacks are denied

184. See Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 9, 9 (2003)
(finding that although the Supreme Court upheld the Michigan Law School's affirmative
action admissions policies in Grutter, the multiple opinions in the case revealed the deep
divisions that remain in our society over the legitimacy of race-conscious policies and the
meaning of equal protection because of debates about the concept of "colorblindness");
BROWN ET AL., supra note 3; see also Calmore, supra note 45, at 207 (describing the
argument that "achievements of blacks who rise above society's lowest strata are viewed
with suspicion and seen as a result of the special privilege of affirmative action rather than
of merit" when looking at it "according to objective, 'color blind' criteria"); Schwartz,
supra note 105, at 685-86 ("The main thrust of the colorblind approach to affirmative action
cases is to restrain the actions of private and governmental entities to protect, primarily,
white males.").
185. Kim, supra note 184, at 10 & n.9 (stating the opinions of Supreme Court Justices
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia in Grutter (Thomas, J.dissenting)); see also GUINIER
& TORRES, supra note 84, at 32-66 (critiquing the use of colorblindness in society).
186. Calmore, supra note 45, at 208 & n.32; see also Leonard Pitts, Affirmative Action's
Big Winners: White Males, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2003, at 25 ("We all want to feel that we
made it on our own merits ....On the other hand, there's a word for those who believe race
is not a significant factor in white success: Delusional. It is not coincidence, happenstance
or evidence of their intellectual, physical or moral superiority that white guys dominate
virtually every field of endeavor worth dominating. It is, rather, a sign that the proverbial
playing field is not level and never has been.").
187. See Calmore, supra note 45, at 208 & n.35 ("Beyond consciously held attitudes,
racist mentality may also display what Paul Brest has described as 'racially selective
indifference"').
188. See African Americans' Status is 73% of Whites Says New "State of Black
at
available
LEAGUE,
URBAN
NAT'L
Report,
2004
America"
http://www.nul.org/news/2004/soba.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
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mortgages and home improvement loans at twice the rate of whites; and the
only area that blacks measure better than whites is in civic engagement,
where blacks serve in the government and become union members more
than their white counterparts.'89
As one group of commentators recently exclaimed, "[p]erhaps the
most striking evidence that overt discrimination is still practiced, is
employers' widespread use of derogatory preconceptions to judge the
qualifications of young black men."'9 In a 2003 study, two young high
school graduates with similar qualifications applied for various entry-level
jobs advertised in a Milwaukee newspaper.'9' The listed jobs included lowskilled positions as waiters, dishwashers, drivers and warehousemen.'92
The only major distinction in the job histories the two individuals provided
was that one applicant was white and admitted to having served an
eighteen-month jail sentence for possession of cocaine.'93 The other
applicant was black and did not have a criminal record." In this study,
these applicants visited 350 potential employers in the Milwaukee area in
response to job ads. Their success rates were similar. The white applicant
with a criminal record was called back for another interview seventeen
percent of the time, and the black applicant with no criminal record was
called back fourteen percent of the time. 9 The creators of this experiment
concluded that a young black male seeking employment carried the same
disadvantage because of his race as a white man carrying an eighteenmonth conviction for cocaine possession."
189. Id.
190. BROWN ET AL., supra note 3, at 226. Another example of overt discrimination is the
increasing number of incidents in the workplace involving the placement of nooses as a
form of racial harassment. See Aaron Bernstein, Racism in the Workplace: In an
Increasingly Multicultural U.S., Harassment of Minorities is On the Rise, BUS. WK.(July
30, 2001), available at http:/lwww.businessweek.com/magazinelcontent/0Ll311b3743084.
htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) (describing threatening situations involving nooses).
191. See David Wessel, Racial Discrimination:Still at Work in the U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 2003, at A2, available at http://www.careerjoumal.com/myc/diversity/20030916wessel.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) (describing a study to determine which candidate is
more likely to get called back).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Another study reported in 2002 had candidates with the same or similar
qualifications respond to help-wanted ads in the Boston and Chicago areas with the only
difference being the use of white-sounding first names like Emily, Kristen, Brendan, and
Greg along with white-sounding last names like Walsh or Baker versus black-sounding first
names like Lakisha, Aisha, Jamal and Rasheed along with black-sounding last names like
Jackson or Jones. Id. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Brendan
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment in Labor Market
Discrimination,
(unpublished
paper
Nov.
18,
2002),
available
at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/apmicro/am02/bertrand-021204.pdf (last visited Nov.
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Asking blacks to deny their identity and suggesting that efforts to
highlight identity are divisive perpetuates the racist dynamics prevalent in
our system. The reality is that racism persists, and asking those who face
economic oppression based on their race to deny this existence forces them
to either blame themselves or lose self-esteem when it is racism that is
really at work. As the old saying goes, there is "strength in numbers," and
acknowledging racial identity presents an opportunity for the "formulation
of an effective collective point of view.""'
More than twenty years ago, John Calmore stated: "For those
lawyering on behalf of the black poor, the present state of affairs is
particularly distressing because racism so synergistically combines with
class oppression." '98 He also explained:
[A]lthough class status plays a larger role than ever before in the
life style and opportunities of blacks, due to ubiquitous racism
and the law's reluctance to confront the issues arising from broad
economic inequality, it is imperative that legal advocates treat the
black poor as special, unique victims of racism. The error of
seeing the plight of the black poor as a consequence of racism
that of viewing their
alone should not now be transformed into
99
plight as a consequence of classism only.
Calmore has eloquently identified the dilemma created by the class and
race puzzle and posited a persuasive solution by having legal advocates
recognize the class and race dynamic while still treating the black poor in a
unique way. His now more than twenty-year old proposition and its
concern about racism and the law's reluctance to confront issues arising
from broad economic inequality still applies today.
This Article poses no clear solution to bridging the broad race and
class divide that continues to pit black workers seeking civil rights
protection against unions with majority white constituents who want class
improvement. Meanwhile, union membership continues its rapid decline,
and employees seeking to protect their civil rights without the help of
unions and in the formal court system or its alternatives also face dismal
returns. With these gloomy results, time is running out for unions to unite
with black workers for racial and class justice. At a time when the

20, 2004). The authors of that study found that applicants with the white-sounding names
were fifty percent more likely to be called for job interviews compared to the candidates
with black-sounding names. Id.
197. Calmore, supra note 45, at 219.
198. Id. at 203 & n.13.
199. Id. at 204.
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Supreme Court in Grutter 20 and employers in amicus briefs therein have
touted the need for racially diverse leaders in our workplaces, unions have
a pressing need to take the lead in matters of racial justice. Likewise,
employees who have to navigate the racial justice system on their own need
assistance in pursuing their discrimination claims.
Furthermore, the factor of multiple races further complicates the
difficult questions regarding inter- and intra-racial dynamics that the race
and class divide presents."' However, if organized labor does not find a
way to seek more racial justice as the increasing number of people of color
enter the workplace, 2 union membership will continue to wane and unions
may soon disappear. This decline of labor is also occurring at a time when
employees are expressing a preference to have more of a collective voice in
the workplace. 23 Those employees face daunting obstacles in obtaining
200. 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (holding that affirmative action is constitutional as long as
race is only one of many factors being considered).
201. See Deborah Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture, and the New Diversity in
the New Millennium, 31 CUMB. L. REv. 481, 486, 501 (2001) (noting "the emergence of a
multiracial group whose members do not self-identify themselves within the traditional
racial framework" that has developed from the increasing number of interracial marriages
and biracial children and that since the 1960s the "[firom a dichotomous black/white model,
the demographics have shifted to include many groups of people of color."); see also
Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1705 (2000)
(describing the difficulties of dark-skinned blacks versus light-skinned blacks); Tanya
Katerf Hernndez, "Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classificationsin an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence,57 MD. L. REv. 97, 98-99 (1998) (highlighting the debate about the meaning
of multiracial categories); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DuKE
L.J. 1487, 1489 (2000) (examining the significance of discrimination within racial
classifications based on color); Hope Lewis, Global Intersections: Critical Race Feminist
Human Rights and Inter/national Black Women, 50 ME. L. REv. 309, 311 (1998)
(describing unique issues for Jamaican American women).
As interracial marriages increase, even the definition of racial identity becomes
clouded as more children with multicultural heritage arrive in the workplace. See Calmore,
supra note 45, at 218 (describing how "the multiplying claims of 'minorities' are
overloading the civil rights enforcement process and beclouding priorities"). Deborah
Ramirez and Jana Rumminger have described the rapid growth in interracial marriage as
follows: "The rate of black and white marriages has increased seventy-eight percent since
1980, and thirty-eight percent of American-Japanese females, eighteen percent of AmericanJapanese males, and seventy percent of American-Indians enter into interracial marriages."
Ramirez & Rumminger, supra note 201, at 486 (citations omitted). Popular golfer Eldrick
"Tiger" Woods addressed this identity phenomenon at the time of his rise to stardom by
referring to himself as not black but as "Cablinasian," a mixture of Caucasian, Black,
Indian, and Asian. Id. at 487 n.29 (citing Michael A. Fletcher, Woods Puts PersonalFocus
on Mixed-Race Identity, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1997, at Al).
202. See Ramirez & Rumminger, supra note 201, at 481 ("By the year 2050, the nonHispanic white population will diminish to less than fifty-five percent of the entire
population, while people of color will comprise greater than forty-five percent of the United
States population.").
203. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 135-36, 150-55
(1999) (describing statistical results from a study of workers and their desires and finding
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racial justice without legal representation while unions face the prospect of
extermination.
IV. EMBRACING
RACIAL
JUSTICE
BY
FILLING
REPRESENTATION VOID FOR INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES

A.

THE

LEGAL

Using Union Racial Identity Caucuses to Provide Legal Service Plans

In some areas of the country, unions are recognizing that they must
capitalize on the diverse racial interests of workers, and those unions are
successfully organizing those workers."° Also, through the use of racial
caucuses, associations, and coalitions within the organized labor
movement, many workers of color are finding their voice."05 Unions'
historical exclusion of people of color and women fostered the creation of
their own identity caucuses.2" Some employers have even encouraged the
formation of employee racial identity organizations. 7 Likewise, a number
of scholars have argued for the use of employee caucuses organized around
racial identity or other sources of common interest."' Although some
they want more voice in the workplace and would be amenable to some form of
representation in dealing with their employers, possibly through an employee committee,
although not necessarily by a union).
204. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future
of the American Labor Movement Depends on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089,
1091-92 (1999) (describing high-profile organizing victories, including the "Justice for
Janitors" campaign in Los Angeles, and the increasing number of Latinos being organized);
Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and
Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 71-95 (2000) (discussing
creative strategies to organize domestic and home care workers). "For example, the Service
Employees International Union's successful Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles
traces its success in significant part to its ability to forge alliances with Black and Latino/a
organizations and churches in the community." Crain, supra note 3, at 214 n. 11.
205. See Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in
the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 92-94, 140-43 (2002) (highlighting the
developments and value of identity caucuses and exploring the voices of power at work);
Maria L. Ontiveros, Forging Our Identity: TransformativeResistance in the Areas of Work,
Class, and the Law, 33 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 (2000) (identifying the
importance of organizing immigrant workers based on identity issues); Michael J. Yelnosky,
Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 613-21 (describing
identity-based caucuses as a means of protecting employees' rights against discrimination
under Title VII).
206. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1346-51 (noting that people of color were
"invisible" to organized labor, leading to a focus on identity and individual rights instead of
collective rights).
207. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System
of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 172-73 (1993) (discussing an employersponsored black caucus of employees at Xerox).
208. See Crain, supra note 87, at 1331-32 & n.115; Garcia, supra note 205, at 108-114
(providing background information on how identity caucuses within unions have helped

20041

RACIAL JUSTICE IN UNIONS

supporters of racial identity coalitions have argued for empowerment
through separation from the main union, these arguments have also raised
concerns about divisiveness.2" Such claims for empowerment through
racial identity are sometimes viewed to resemble the divisiveness of
"earlier calls for black nationalism" that some feared would create division
between blacks and non-blacks.2 1°
people of color); Rachel Geman, Safeguarding Employee Rights in a Post-Union World: A
New Conception of Employee Communities, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 369, 379-89
(1997) (describing how caucuses add value in the non-union setting because they stress
community action with benefits going to all workers and by providing a broader stage for
collective self-help than is available under individually based statutes like Title VII); Hyde,
supra note 207, at 160 n.38 (discussing the legal status of employee caucuses in the nonunion workplace); Yelnosky, supra note 205, at 613-21 (advocating identity-based caucuses
as a means of protecting employees' rights against discrimination under Title VII); see also
Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment:
The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 61-80 (1995) (suggesting the formation of
identity caucuses organized across occupations in order to protect women workers against
discrimination in unionized workplaces, particularly in situations where representing women
creates issues of role conflict for the union); Gould, supra note 102, at 58-64 (proposing
third-party intervention in labor arbitrations when necessary to adequately represent
minority interests within the union, particularly those of racial minorities).
209. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1340 & n.5 (describing arguments
supporting identity coalitions and their separation from the general union). See also Gould,
supra note 102, at 58-64 (arguing for third party intervention to represent black workers'
interests).
210. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1351; see also Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming
the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Postmodern Perspective in the Mirror of
Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 472-73 (2000) (asserting that efforts

at seeking racial identity can correlate with black nationalism and suggesting that unions
should not have broad dues collection for all because they may conflict with the interests of
subgroups, including those representing identities that have historically been denied and
excluded). The issue of "black nationalism" is highlighted by the arguments of Professor
Derrick Bell regarding racial realism and the permanence of racism, emphasizing that blacks
should accept that racism is permanent and not rely on any help or system that involves
whites. See Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 45. But see Leroy D. Clark, A Critique of
Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Permanence of Racism and His Strategy of
Confrontation, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 23, 29 (1995) (criticizing Professor Bell's view that
coalitions cannot be achieved with non-blacks and recognizing the "long history of effective
white cooperation with blacks," including incidents involving white members of the
NAACP and the Urban League); Kevin Hopkins, Back to Afrolantica: A Legacy of (Black)
Perseverance?,24 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 447, 472-73 (1998) (criticizing Bell's
view that "nobody can free us but ourselves" by identifying a number of successful joint
black-white coalitions, including a labor coalition formed by Jewish labor leaders and A.
Phillip Randolph). Although the black nationalist argument may arise when blacks seek to
focus on identity, most coalitions involved with the growth of racial justice issues in
organized labor will eventually have to focus on coalitions between blacks and whites even
if initially there is a need for separation. See, e.g., ALEX HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 256 (1965) (describing Malcolm X's encounter with a

"little blonde co-ed" who asked him if there was anything she could do to show that some
white people were good and could work with blacks for improvement when Malcolm
responded, "nothing"). However, Malcolm X later regretted his response and although still
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Despite the claims that these racial identity coalitions create
divisiveness,21 ' a labor and employment law professor, Ruben Garcia, has
amply demonstrated through empirical and anecdotal support that
coalitions centered on racial identity tend to support the general labor
movement and have no desire to separate from it because "numbers mean
strength. ''1 Rather, these groups create empowerment for workers of color
who may find it difficult to have their concerns addressed in a majority
white union. They allow some voice from these coalitions on racial
interests while still providing the overall cohesiveness of having a union to
support the general concerns of all workers. The very nature of how these
racial caucuses, associations, and coalitions exist successfully within
general labor groups suggests the one major area where the potential to
bridge the race and class divide may occur. Race and class issues can
coalesce in the workplace if organized labor begins assisting individual
employees in obtaining legal representation in race discrimination disputes.
The refusal to recognize racial identity and affirm the need for racial
justice warrants concern, as "many scholars who stress the importance of
identity also emphasize the need for separation or isolation from the larger
group as a way of preserving one's identity or at least of not subverting
one's interests to those of the larger group. 21 3 As authors Molly McUsic
and Michael Selmi have asserted, "The real question, of course, is whether
there is an alternative between the twin evils of fragmentation, on the one
hand, and sacrificing one's identity in the pursuit of solidarity, on the
'4
other.

21

Elizabeth Iglesias has also argued that identity groups should be
provided with a form of power to reject certain obligations, namely the
duty of fair and exclusive representation by one union for all employees,
when involved with unions under a collective bargaining agreement."' A
likely result of eliminating the exclusive representation requirement would
not believing that whites could join his organization "as a Black Nationalist," he did believe
they could help him from within their own organizations. Id. at 376-77 (suggesting a
coalition without denying his black nationalist identity).
211. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1353 (discussing the "divide and conquer"
approach that employers can use as a result of racial identity efforts).
212. See Garcia, supra note 205, at 148-49, 151-52 (discussing a survey that found that
ninety-six percent of those surveyed (or 28 out of 29 subjects) wanted to bargain with their
unions, rather than with caucuses or individually).
213. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1340; see also Yelnosky, supra note 205, at 620
n.239 ("Denying self-identified subgroups the power of self-representation on the ground
that separate bargaining will splinter workers into competing subgroups ignores the fact that
the groups have already been constituted and individual interests have already been
fragmented across the divisions which discrimination has created." (emphases omitted)
(citing Iglesias, supra note 85, at 430)).
214. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1341.
215. Iglesias, supra note 85, at 404-21.
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be multiple unions in a single workplace that might represent different
groups of workers along identity lines." 6 Michael Yelnosky, a labor and
employment professor, has asserted quite persuasively that racial identity
caucuses can help individuals in the mediation of employment
discrimination claims. 2 7 He suggests having the caucus participate in the
mediation with an employee if that employee so desires.2"8 While that is
certainly an option, the proposal in this Article is to use the caucus to put
its collective financial resources together to obtain legal services for an
employee in whatever forum the dispute will be handled: court, arbitration,
or mediation.
McUsic and Selmi have criticized the increased prevalence of identity
groups as a form of fragmentation of labor where multiple groups develop
and individuals who are members of various identity groups can become
conflicted when the interests of one group may not mesh with another
group.2 9 Also, the criticism of identity groups by McUsic and Selmi
emphasizes that some employees do not enter the workplace with a "fixed
identity" and that being forced to organize around a particular identity may
be limiting.22 Finally, to highlight their critique, McUsic and Selmi use the
racial identity organizations within a number of police and firefighter
and describe a case study to explore the effects
groups as a reference point
22
of racial identity groups. '
That case study consists of a labor dispute involving firefighters in a
southern city and the application of an affirmative action decree related to
The authors conclude that the identity
promotion and hiring.222
organizations representing the black firefighters had achieved some gains
for the black firefighters. 223 They also conclude, however, that the two
organizations ended up preventing gains where all firefighters could have
been "better off' because of the difference in positions of the two groups,
the employer to "consciously made use of this fragmentation to its
advantage."224 One of the authors had acted as counsel for the black
216. Id.
217. See Yelnosky, supra note 205, at 614-21.
218. Id. at 617.
219. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1354-55.
220. Id. at 1357-58; see also Ramirez & Rumminger, supra note 201, at 490 (arguing
that with the increasing multiracial culture in our country, being asked to identify racial or
ethnic identity through the use of "racial categories [can] limit individuals, because the
challenge to determine an identity, in the midst of the outside world imposing external
stereotypes, seems unattainable").
221. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1361-65 (describing a case study centered on a
debate between an organization representing the interests of white firefighters and an
organization representing the interests of black firefighters).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1363.
224. Id. at 1363-64.

104

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 7:1

firefighter association involved in the case study. 2"
Despite the important points raised by McUsic and Selmi, their
critique is limited to those who believe that identity groups must function
exclusive of and apart from the solidarity interests of all workers. Neither
group in their case study "represented a clear majority," nor was either part
of a general group representing the interests of all workers. 26 McUsic and
Selmi ultimately conclude there is an opportunity for racial identity groups
to exist without becoming divisive and detrimental to overall solidarity of
workers.227 Ruben Garcia has addressed this issue recently in his finding
that traditional identity groups formed within existing unionized structures
do not have the goal of separating themselves from the general union.22
Instead, they view their roles as being inclusive and part of the overall.
goals of the union.229
Black caucuses and coalitions can establish legal service plans that
individual black employees both within and outside of the union may then
use to obtain appropriate legal help. Unions can foster racial justice by
adopting mechanisms that allow these legal service plans to develop from
the dues of black caucus members. Hopefully, organized labor can view
this as a way to effectively balance individual rights against discrimination
with its primary goal of improving collective rights through better wages
for workers.23 ° Although it might be difficult to deal with the diverging
interests of their multicultural constituencies, unions can and normally do
handle the competing concerns of their memberships as a matter of
common practice."'
One could still ask why unions and their members should invest their
hard-earned money in legal services for employees who are not even
members, and especially as a means to promote racial justice. As we have
seen, the majority of white male union constituents may view efforts to
promote racial justice as in conflict with class justice or as presenting a
more direct threat to their individual positions. Consequently, these unions
may see no incentive to support racial justice overall, even those in public
225. Id. at 1362 n.97.
226. Id. at 1364.
227. Id. at 1367-73.
228. Garcia, supra note 205, at 148-53.
229. Id.; McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1369 ("Even on an issue as divisive as
affirmative action, workers may find common ground through the realization that it is in
their collective interest to play a role in shaping the policy free from outside influence.").
230. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1787.
231. This conflict is not limited to race and extends to gender. See Reginald Alleyne,
Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 4-8 (1999) (describing the potential conflicts for unions in sexual
harassment disputes between employees and describing duty of fair representation issues for
unions in processing sexual harassment claims that pit one union member (the female
complainant) against another union member (the alleged male harasser)).
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sector unions, where race matters significantly in the communities they
serve.
The resolution to this concern can be addressed through the racial
identity caucuses, associations, and coalitions within the labor union.23 2 If
those groups collect money to support racial justice claims through their
union dues, their unions would have the financial support to provide legal
representation directly from the financial sources of the black employees
who are members of the union. Another positive byproduct of having
unions assist individual black employees by providing legal representation
would be that black employee members of the union would see their dues
being used by the union directly for the support of racial justice issues
rather than being used against them to challenge affirmative action plans by
bringing reverse discrimination suits. 33
Garcia noted that "the AFL-CIO 'support groups' include the longexisting Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), the A. Phillip
These black
Randolph Institute," and other key black coalitions 2 '
coalitions within labor unions may need another A. Phillip Randolph to
navigate the political waters within their unions to make this use of union
dues work in a way in which black coalition members can help individual
black employees obtain legal representation in pursuing discrimination
claims. Although organized labor has some black members in high level
positions, no black figure today provides the voice that A. Phillip Randolph
offered in bridging the issues of race and organized labor.235
232. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 85, at 1373 ("It is likewise clear that unions have
strong incentives to make these changes insofar as addressing the interests of those who the
union has previously ignored (such as women and minorities) will increase the
attractiveness of unions to those groups-groups that are increasingly pervading the
workforce. Indeed, it appears that the new leadership of the AFL-CIO is targeting women
and minorities as a way to expand and diversify their membership base.").
233. As noted earlier in Part III.B.2, supra, and in the initial quotes at the beginning of
this Article, black firefighters in Chicago were concerned that their union dues were being
used by the union in efforts to challenge affirmative action programs designed to help them.
By following the proposal in this Article, union dues or some percentage of income paid by
members of racial identity coalitions could go into a fund that would provide legal
representation services.
234. Garcia, supra note 205, at 84; see also the AFL-CIO Constituency Groups website,
at http://www.aflcio.org/communitypartners/constituencies/ (last Nov. 20, 2004); the A.
Philip Randolph Institute website, at http://www.apri.org/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); the
website,
at
Trade
Unionists
of
Black
Coalition
http://www.cbtu.org/2003website/2003home.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
235. A. Philip Randolph transcended his role as a union leader by becoming a prominent
national leader in civil rights. He helped to get the first anti-discrimination laws passed in
response to his threat to organize a march on Washington in the 1940s. He was one of the
principle organizers of the famous 1963 march on Washington where Martin Luther King
gave his "I Have a Dream Speech." See Green, supra note 38, at 317-19 & nn.33-34.
Randolph, unlike those very few black leaders of unions today, had a broad influence as a
black leader that transcended his union leadership. Id.
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When issues of race and civil rights in the workplace are being
addressed, noted figures like Johnnie Cochran, Attorney; Kweisi Mfume,
President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People; Reverend Jesse Jackson, President of Operation Push/Rainbow
Coalition; Reverend Al Sharpton, Civil Rights Activist; or Tavis Smiley,
Author and Radio/TV Personality, come to mind. Each of these individuals
were recently listed by black magazine Ebony on its list of 100+ Most
Influential Black Americans.236
After listing individuals, Ebony identified a list of selected
organizational leaders by the following criteria:
1. The nominee must be the chief executive officer of an
independent organization that commands widespread influence
beyond its field. 2. The organization must be a broad-based
national group with a mass membership, a national headquarters
and a full-time staff. 3. The nominee and his or her organization
must transcend a particular field, occupation or specialty and
must have an ongoing program affecting the vital interests of
African-Americans.237
Within that list, only five black union leaders were listed: William Burrus,
President of the American Postal Workers Union; William Lucy, President
of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CTU); James McGee, President
of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees; Gene Upshaw,
Executive Director of the NFL Players Association; and Reg Weaver,
President of the National Education Association, the largest professional
employee organization.238 Also, Marie Smith, a black woman, has become
the President of AARP, an organization that has a major role in employee
rights.239 None of these individuals appear to be recognizable household
names that are consistently involved in the public debate about civil rights
in the workplace. In fact, they may be relatively unknown outside the labor
industry and groups they represent.
If organized labor cultivated a dynamic black leader, that individual,
as a modern day A. Philip Randolph, could represent the interests of labor

236. See 100+ Most Influential Black Americans, EBONY, May 2004, at 128. Individual
members were chosen based upon the following criteria: "1. Does the individual transcend
his or her position and command widespread national influence? 2. Does the individual
affect in a decisive and positive way the lives, thinking and actions of large segments of the
African-American population, either by his or her position in a key group or by his or her
personal reach and influence?" Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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unions and the rights of black workers with a strong and zesty voice."4 0 He
or she could also lead the efforts of an internal fight within organized labor
to start seeking racial justice. Also, this individual could persuade
organized labor to allow racial identity coalitions to allocate their union
dues toward establishing legal representation plans for the assistance of
individual employees in discrimination disputes.
B.

ProvidingLegal Services to Achieve Racial Justice

As we have already discovered, "[iln the majority of all conflict
resolutions, individuals proceed without the representation of a lawyer.""
Likewise, unrepresented "parties [also] tend to dominate alternative dispute
resolution forums."2 '2 Therefore, it has become necessary for the legal
profession and the organized bar to respond to the growing issue of the
unrepresented litigant, whether in the judicial or the ADR forum. The bar
has recently tried to respond to issues for the unrepresented by establishing
opportunities for legal assistance that involve lawyers in ways that do not
encompass full representation, including: (1) establishing a website with
referral services; (2) supporting the use of telephone hotlines for giving
legal advice and information; (3) allowing unbundled or a la carte delivery
of legal services which allow attorneys to provide discrete services for selfrepresented litigants; and (4) establishing lawyer panels for unbundled
services as an alternative to full representation for separate services like
advice, negotiations, document preparation, or review.243

As William

Hornsby, a staff counsel for the ABA's Standing Committee on the
Delivery of Legal Services, recently explained, the key to addressing the
unrepresented litigant problem in whichever forum chosen should be to
focus on allowing "unbundled services" because "it is better for clients,
practitioners, and judges for lawyers to be involved in a portion of the
litigation rather than none at all." 2"
240. I have even thought that the answer for organized labor to embrace racial justice
may be to have a key civil rights leader like Kweisi Mfume, president of the NAACP,
become the head of the AFL-CIO. However, it would be doubtful that an outsider to the
labor movement could take up its leadership, much less a black outsider. But the lack of
key black civil rights leaders who also have strong ties to the labor movement has
exacerbated the divide between organized labor and civil rights groups and prevented them
from establishing significant and lasting coalitions.
241. William Hornsby, Defining the Role of Lawyers in Pro Se Litigation, 41 JUDGES' J.
5, 5 (Fall 2002).
242. Id. at 5; see also Crain, supra note 208, 79-80 (describing results from a study
showing that with the increasing use of dispute resolution in the non-union workplace, the
need for representation in those disputes would grow).
243. See Hornsby, supra note 241, at 8-10.
244. Id. at 9-11 (discussing the concern that self-represented litigants may not need full
representation, and if ethics rules, policies and procedures were advanced to allow more
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Unions can directly help employees in handling race discrimination
disputes by providing legal representation through a firm on retainer to the
union, to the caucus, or through a legal service plan. As Matthew Finkin
has noted, "[t]he idea of unions as legal service providers is not novel" 245
and could work "if the system were organized as a pre-paid legal insurance
plan geared to represent only those who have chosen to pay in"2 '6 to the
plan. What does present a novel idea is for unions to develop a legal
service plan focused on helping their black members or even black nonmembers in fighting individual discrimination claims.
An example of a legal service plan that groups of employees may use
exists in Texas, where police officers may join an organization called
CLEAT, Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas. As part of
their membership dues, CLEAT members receive legal representation from
a legal service plan. 47 Likewise, unions could obtain a similar form of
legal services from their dues or through salary reduction that would offer
discrete forms of legal representation or unbundled legal services for
individual black employees pursuing discrimination claims whether in a
court proceeding or through an alternative forum.
1. Addressing Legal Service Needs for Black Non-Union Employees
In the past, unions have used the offer of legal representation as a
means of organizing groups of employees in a non-union setting. This may
raise some concerns under traditional labor law should the union actually
go forward with the organizing efforts and have an election governed by
the rules and procedures of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
In some instances, the offering of legal services as a means of organizing
has been challenged as conferring an improper benefit on voters in an
NLRB election campaign process.24
unbundled services, self-represented litigants may be benefited); see also Forrest S. Mosten,
Unbundling Legal Services: Servicing Clients Within Their Ability to Pay, 40 JUDGES' J. 15
(2001) (describing how most of the public no longer desires a full service legal package of
legal advice, fact investigation, legal research, correspondence and pleadings preparation,
negotiation, representation at hearings, formal discovery, and trial, so that lawyers ought to
be allowed to unbundle those services into discrete provisions of one or more of those
services to help prevent the spread of self-represented litigants while navigating potential
malpractice and ethical concerns for attorneys attempting to provide these unbundled
services).
245. Finkin, supra note 82, at 86.
246. Id. at 87.
247. See CLEAT's website, at http://www.cleat.org/philos.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2004) (describing its legal services plan).
248. See Catherine L. Fisk, Unions Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 57, 60 & nn.13-14 (2002) (describing cases finding that a union can violate labor
law when it offers free legal services to the employees who will vote for the union in an
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Unions may circumvent concerns about NLRB election procedures by
choosing not to actually organize the employees or by deciding to seek
direct recognition of the union rather than pursuing an NLRB election as
part of its process of offering legal services.2 49 Despite not having an
organizing objective, the offering of legal services to non-union employees
would still show that a union can embrace a racial justice cause while the
black caucus members of the union can see their union dues or payments
being used directly for a racial justice benefit.
Some may question whether black caucus union members or any
union members would be willing to donate any portion of their paycheck as
an investment in legal services for individuals who are not members of that
union and not even in the same workplace, especially if it is not done as
part of a direct organizing objective. 250 However, individual non-union
employees who have been able to obtain legal services through the union
and its black caucus will tend to see the benefits of having a union behind
them. Then, they may decide to pursue union representation on their own
accord at a later time without raising the issue of direct vote buying in a
corresponding organizing campaign and election. Although this indirect
organizing incentive does not represent a clear and concrete benefit that
will result, it represents a better use of union dues for black union members
than seeing the money go to fight affirmative action through reverse
discrimination disputes.
The AFL-CIO also provides a program where union members can
have payroll deductions allocated toward community service projects.25'
This Article proposes that union members could just directly allocate those
funds to develop legal service plans. By focusing the money on providing
a legal service plan for individuals who are not union members or even in
NLRB election).
249. Id. at 75-79 (describing how unions will have to organize outside of seeking union
elections if giving pre-election legal help to employees will set aside a favorable NLRB
election result and describing ways unions can service non-union employees in arbitration or
other ways outside of an organizing campaign); see also Finkin, supra note 82, at 81-89
(discussing ways in which a union might help non-union employees in employment
arbitrations despite labor law limitations).
250. I thank Professor Cynthia Nance for suggesting this concern to me. A recent study
indicates that black workers tend to be much more egalitarian and generous when it comes
to solidarity centered on racial justice. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 84, at 89
(describing a study by a sociologist Michele Lamont where she compared a group of blue
collar white workers to black workers and found more group loyalty for blacks and
individual approaches for whites so that a "black worker defined all black people as his kin
and wanted to have enough money to help people" and the people to be helped "don't have
to be our relatives, just be black and need it," and another black worker said he was
"interested in things that are going to help minorities" because he has "always been for the
underdog because of [his] upbringing [where he had been] discriminated against").
251. See the AFL-CIO Union Community Fund description, at http://www.aflcio.org/
communitypartners/ucf/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
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the same workplace as the union members, the donations would constitute
a clear community service, as most individual black employees who face
the obstacle of obtaining legal representation for an employment
discrimination claim are not in unions.
Also, by offering legal representation for non-union individual
employees in discrimination disputes, either in the courts or alternatives to
the courts, unions and their black caucuses can expand their influence on
the overall processing and handling of workplace disputes. Unions would
bring significant collective power to bear in seeking racial justice for nonunion employees because the unions and the legal service providers they
offer, would be repeat players who could balance the repeat player
advantage that employers and their counsel maintain.
As a result, unions would also be in the position to inspire non-union
employers to adopt more proactive steps to improve racial justice,
including the adoption of affirmative action policies and fair dispute
resolution systems. This would not occur out of a direct union organizing
agenda or through collective bargaining representation, but as a result of
resolving an individual discrimination dispute where the union provided the
individual non-union employee with legal representation. Then, unions can
start to gain some of the ground that they have lost over the last fifty years
as the workplace has transformed from a strong unionized workforce
focusing on collective rights to a mostly non-union workforce
concentrating on individual rights including racial justice through
discrimination lawsuits.
2. Addressing Legal Service Needs for Black Caucus Union Members
A much more difficult problem could arise for black employees
already represented by the union when obtaining support from the union in
Labor law prohibits
pursuing individual discrimination claims. 52
employers from dealing directly with any subgroups of employees,
including those organized along racial lines, when those subgroups of
employees are represented by a union. 2 3 However, also under current law,
252. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the
Crisis of Post-War Liberalism, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129, 134-65 (2004)
(describing difficulties and limitations under labor law for minority groups seeking to
address civil rights issues directly with employers when also represented by a union,
especially when that union is not ready to embrace affirmative action and civil rights in the
belief that it will sacrifice seniority rights).
253. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52, 70 (1975); see
also Calvin William Sharpe, "Judging in Good Faith" - Seeing Justice Marshall'sLegacy
Through a Labor Case, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 479, 481-93 (1994) (describing the significance of
the Emporium Capwell case). But see Iglesias, supra note 84, at 429-30 (arguing that
because the workforce in Emporium Capwell was already divided along racial lines,
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from the Supreme Court's 1974 decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,254 a union employee can pursue any individual claim under Title VII in
court even if he had already used the grievance and arbitration process
provided by the employer and his union pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement."' According to the Court in Gardner-Denver,by processing
the employee's grievance through arbitration, the union had not waived the
statutory rights of the employee to file a Title VII claim." 6 The Court also
found that a union cannot agree to waive an individual employee's future
pursuit of statutory rights in court. 57 Thus, it is assumed that union
employees may pursue two bites of the same dispute apple with its
employer: one in the union-sponsored arbitration process pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement and the other in the individual-sponsored
court process pursuant to the strictures of Title VII. 258
In its most recent case on the subject, the Supreme Court in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.259 addressed the issue of whether an
agreement for arbitration by a union in a collective bargaining agreement
would be enforceable in preventing an individual employee from pursuing
a discrimination claim."6 The Court decided that in order for a union to
waive an individual employee's right to pursue a discrimination claim in a
judicial forum, a clear and unmistakable relinquishment of the right to
pursue the statutory claim in question must exist. 6'
Thus, under current law, individual union members are still allowed
to pursue their Title VII claims separately unless the union takes the
granting legal protection to the black workers who sought to press their claims with the
employer would not create a divide).
254. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
255. Id. at 50 (finding that "[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and
statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same
factual occurrence" and noting that "no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to
be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.").
256. Id. at 51-52.
257. Id. at 51. The Court subsequently banned prospective waivers by a union of an
individual employee's rights under other statutes in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (banning waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)) and Barrentine v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (banning waivers under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000)). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (illustrating that in a non-union setting, the Supreme Court
has allowed the prospective waiver of a judicial forum in enforcing agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims which were made as a condition of employment).
258. See generally Mary K. O'Melveny, One Bite of the Apple and One of the Orange:
Interpreting Claims That Collective Bargaining Agreements Should Waive the Individual
Employee's Statutory Rights, 19 LAB. LAW. 185 (2004) (describing the ramifications of
allowing an employee to pursue claims in both the arbitral and the judicial forum and
concerns that employers raise about it).
259. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
260. Id. at 72.
261. Id. at 79-80.
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unlikely action of making a clear and unmistakable waiver of an
employee's right to do so.' 62 Because employees may proceed directly to
court or to individual arbitration when the dispute involves an individual
employment discrimination claim, there is no concern about violating labor
law by having subgroups or racial identity caucuses working with an
individual employee in the handling of the Title VII claim.
One decision issued since Wright has raised concerns about the
Gardner-Denver requirement of allowing a union employee to take
discrimination claims to court despite the existence of an arbitration
In Air Line Pilots
process in the collective bargaining agreement.
Association, International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,263 the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied GardnerDenver and ruled that if a union cannot generally prospectively waive an
employee's right to trial, then an employer can negotiate directly with the
employees about individual arbitration agreements without having to deal
with the union. 2"
On one hand, this decision seems to disregard the union's role and
would normally raise concerns under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),265 which the National Labor Relations Board ruled prohibits an
employer from dealing directly with employees who are represented by a
union.2" It also appears to be contrary to the purpose of the NLRA which
recognizes that problems of bargaining power between employees and their
employers, and the consequences from that imbalance, require that
employees have the legal authorization to use unions as their representative
to bridge that bargaining power gap in agreeing to deal with an
employment matter.267
262. Cf.Crain & Matheny, supra note 83, at 1842 (asserting that "unions will have a
powerful disincentive to negotiate for antidiscrimination provisions in labor contracts
because they risk waiving unit members' rights to proceed in court with statutory
antidiscrimination claims.").
263. 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
264. Id. at 484-86. However, Professor Ann Hodges has recently argued that employee
efforts to seek individual court actions rather than being coerced into agreeing to arbitrate
would invoke rights protected under the National Labor Relations Act as protected
concerted activity. See Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled With
Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 173, 217, 228-29 (2003).
265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
266. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52 (1975).
267. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); see also Richard A.
Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights:
Theoretical Origins and a ProposedSolution, 77 B.U. L. RaV. 687, 688 (1997) (stating that
"[t]he NLRA was premised on the assumption that the best way to protect American
employees was to give them sufficient bargaining power to permit meaningful negotiation
over the terms and conditions of employment."). Cf.Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The PostWar Paradigmin American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511 (1981) (asserting that the
"industrial pluralist view of labor relations" is "based upon a false assumption: the
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On the other hand, this decision highlights the ability of unionrepresented employees to have their individual discrimination claims
operate without some of the limitations of traditional labor law. Under the
proposal herein, the union and its caucus will only provide legal services
and not actually represent the employee in dealing directly with the
employer about the discrimination dispute either in court or arbitration.
The individual employee, with separate legal representation provided by
the union or caucus, can decide whether to proceed with the discrimination
claim in either arbitration by individual agreement or directly in the courts.
As long as Gardner-Denver remains viable, it provides the main
mechanism for allowing unions to work with individual employees in
offering legal services for discrimination suits that are handled separately
from their obligations under labor law.268 A union could encourage the
individual employee to pursue a race discrimination claim separate from
Then, in
the collective bargaining grievance arbitration process.269
whatever forum that the discrimination claim precedes (court, mediation or
arbitration), the union can help provide legal representation through a legal
service plan.
Samuel Estreicher has recently argued that Gardner-Denverprevents
unions from playing more of a role in brokering individual rights, and that
part of the reason is that unions "fear that the costs of broker activity
27
cannot be recouped from membership dues.""
Yet, Estreicher also
recognizes that unions are unlikely to assume the role of agreeing to help
prevent employees from seeking independent Title VII claims. 7 ' However,
his point about unions being in a position to broker for individual employee
rights and the fears of recouping dues remains an area of opportunity.
Instead of trying to get around Gardner-Denver as Estreicher suggests,
employers should embrace it. By helping individual black employees
pursue their discrimination claims through obtaining legal representation,
assumption that management and labor have equal power in the workplace").
268. Professor Samuel Estreicher, while not necessarily happy about it, recently
acknowledged that the holding in Gardner-Denveris still viable in preventing unions from
waiving an individual's separate pursuit of an employment discrimination claim. See
Samuel Estreicher, Living With Gardner-Denver,PERSP. ON WORK Winter 2004 at 23, 25
n.5 (addressing the holding from Gardner-Denver that unions cannot generally negotiate
waivers of individual statutory claims and acknowledging that "[e]ven though the Court
technically reserved the question in that case, I would argue that the union capacity problem
survives Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)."); see also
O'Melveny, supra note 258, at 212-14 (describing some of the criticisms of GardnerDenver and arguing for its continued vitality and usefulness).
269. See Wright, 525 U.S at 74 (describing how the union told plaintiff, Wright, that he
should hire an attorney and pursue his discrimination claim rather than the union pursuing
the claim through arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement).
270. Estreicher, supra note 268, at 23-24.
271. Id.
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the union would have the incentive of supporting racial justice by brokering
legal services for those individual employees. Employers could even allow
the union to play a more specific role in resolving the discrimination
dispute if the union and the individual employee so desired. 272
In that way, the employer folds the individual discrimination claim
into an arbitration process that resembles the grievance and arbitration
process that it already uses with its unions, rather than a court process.
This should benefit employers, as the issue becomes less about allowing
individual employees two bites of the apple-by being able to go to court
individually and also into arbitration through the union-and more about
establishing a fair and quick resolution of discrimination disputes with its
employees. Similarly, the individual black employees who are able to
obtain legal representation and the black caucus members of the union will
see the benefits of achieving racial justice as a direct result of their union
dues or payroll deductions. These joint benefits for unions, their black
members, and the employers can only occur because of Gardner-Denver,
not despite it.
Another way in which employers may benefit from this approach of
supporting individual employees in these disputes is by accounting for the
cost of legal services for the employee up front. The employer could also
reimburse the union or the black caucus for the costs incurred as part of a
legal service plan created for individual employment discrimination claims.
In some ADR plans, employers account for the payment of a flat fee for
their employees' legal services by either paying the fees directly or having
the payment come out of an employee account that has been established by
the employer on behalf of the employee as part of a legal service plan.273
For example, the Haliburton (formerly Brown & Root) company
provides a set amount of money, approximately $2,500, to use in obtaining
legal representation of the employee's own choosing for help in the
company's mediation or arbitration program. 74 It only costs an employee a
272. See Finkin, supra note 82, at 80 (contending that employers have invited unions to
become involved in dispute resolution by sweeping public law into their agreements to
arbitrate and employers cannot deny unions from getting involved); Eugene Scalia, Ending
Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 496-99
(2000) (describing how unions should be in a better position to represent individual
employees in discrimination disputes than plaintiffs' lawyers and that the focus of reform
should be on integrating a role for unions as advocates related to existing employment laws,
especially in handling arbitration of employment discrimination disputes now being
implemented through mandatory arbitration agreements).
273. See Lamont E. Stallworth, Behind the Eight Ball: The Un-Represented Claimant
and Employment Dispute Resolution, ACResolution, Spring 2002, at 26, 29 (describing the
policy of Haliburton (formerly Brown & Root) and the $2500 that employees may use to
retain representation of their choice in the company-sponsored mediation or arbitration
program).
274. Id.; see also Berger, supra note 58, at 536.
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maximum of fifty dollars to proceed in that program. 75 The role of and
payment for lawyers in arbitration under this program is spelled out in
"refreshingly candid" language:
The Company has access to legal advice through its law
department and outside lawyers. You may consult with a lawyer
or any other adviser of your choice. Upon approval of the
Program Administrator, Brown & Root will pay the major part of
your legal fees through the Legal Consultation Plan, up to a
maximum of $2,500. You are not required, however, to hire a
lawyer to participate in arbitration. If you choose not to bring a
lawyer to arbitration, the Company will also participate without a
lawyer. 76
If an employer has a similar kind of plan, it would provide the best
situation for addressing the legal representation gap. Although employers
may not see the benefit of making sure that employees have legal counsel
in helping them resolve an employment discrimination dispute against that
very employer, they will realize them eventually. These early stages of the
twenty-first century represent a major transitional period in how
employment discrimination disputes get resolved. If employers do not take
more proactive steps in the nature of providing legal services to its
employees or unions fail to pursue legal services as a form of racial justice,
then outsiders, including Congress, may have to finally take action to
provide employees a mechanism for fair legal representation in
employment discrimination matters.
Finally, in those few instances where unions or their identity caucuses
cannot offer direct legal services and the issues are of major importance to
racial justice, employees can solicit civil rights groups, like the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund or the Equal Justice Society, to offer the required legal
services. White males seeking to bring reverse discrimination claims
certainly have found groups to help them in challenging affirmative action
plans.
One such organization, Adversity.Net, Inc.,277 provides information for
those white male individuals who want to sue their employers for reverse
275. See Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(describing Brown & Root's arbitration program).
276. Id.
277. According to its website, Adversity.Net is a "non-profit, educational organization
dedicated to the elimination of prejudice and discrimination-including the elimination of
divisive racial preferences and quotas" and its "audience consists of victims and survivors of
racial preferences, set-asides, and race-based 'targets' and 'goals' in hiring, promotion,
school admissions, and government contracting." About Adversity.Net, Adversity.Net, Inc.,
at http://www.adversity.net/about-us.htm (last modified Jan. 31, 2004).
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discrimination by claiming that they have been allegedly discriminated
against because of affirmative action or racial preferences. It also lists on
its website ten different public interest and non-profit firms and twelve
private law firms where those seeking to sue their employers or
governmental entities for reverse discrimination may be able to obtain legal
help."8 Although the site also lists information about cases handled by the
firms and whether or not they will charge fees for legal representation, the
site states that the sources of legal help listed on its website "do not
necessarily endorse the views of Adversity.Net." and that the "listings are
provided free of charge as a public service" without Adversity.Net
receiving any "consideration, payment, or referral fee for publication of
these listings. ' 79
As. white males develop the wherewithal to pursue reverse
discrimination claims either through private organizations or through their
unions, black employees need similar mechanisms to confront direct
discrimination in the workplace. Unions, through their black identity
caucuses or through a majority vote, can allocate union dues or payroll
deductions to establish legal service plans that will support the efforts of
individual black employees in pursuing discrimination claims. With the
dismal prospects of finding legal representation for individual black
employees, a union can finally establish a clear mechanism to pursue racial
justice without it being a divisive proposition for its membership by
providing an opportunity for legal representation to these black employees.
V.

CONCLUSION:

A LAST CHANCE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE BY UNIONS

Desperate times may call for desperate measures. Unions with their
declining membership, and black employees with their limited ability to
obtain an attorney for a discrimination claim, have potentially reached the
point of no return. Without a winning strategy, it may be time to apply the
sports metaphor the "loser goes home."
Under these difficult
278. Legal Help for Victims of Reverse Discrimination, Adversity.Net, Inc. at
http://www.adversity.net/legalhelp.htm (last modified Oct. 14, 2004). The ten public
interest organizations listed on the Adversity.Net website are: Atlantic Legal Foundation;
Campaign for a Color-Blind America; Citizens for the Preservation of Constitutional Rights,
Inc.; Enstrom Foundation; Institute for Justice; Landmark Legal Foundation; Mountain
States Legal Foundation; Pacific Legal Foundation; Southeastern Legal Foundation; and
Washington Legal Foundation. Id. The thirteen private law firms listed on the website are:
Bish, Roth & Butler, Ltd.; Ducar, Lorona & Parks, P.C.; Fett & Linderman, P.C.; Gregory
A. Hall, Attorney at Law; Glen N. Lenhoff, Attorney at Law; Hanan M. Issacs, P.C.; Harold
L. Lichten, Attorney at Law, Pyle, Rome, Lichten & Ehrenberg P.C.; William Piper,
Attorney at Law; Rizik & Rizik, P.C., Attorneys at Law; Rubin and Purcell, LLP; Herbert P.
Schlanger, Law Offices of Herbert P. Schlanger; Charles L. Wiest, Jr., Attorney at Law; and
Tim Willoughby, Willoughby Law Firm. Id.
279. Id.
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RACIAL JUSTICE IN UNIONS

circumstances, it is imperative that unions find a way to seek racial justice
in the workplace. This Article asserts that by using the help of identity
caucuses, unions can embrace justice by establishing legal services for
individual employees to help handle their discrimination claims.
Although organizations are developing to address and fill the need for
legal representation for white males seeking to file reverse discrimination
claims,8 ° individual black male employees have little chance of obtaining
legal representation in employment discrimination lawsuits. The reality is
that if they decide to adjudicate in court or choose an alternative to the
courts, individual black employees, seeking to obtain justice related to an
employment discrimination claim, will have to do so without legal counsel.
The consequences for black employees in pursuing discrimination claims
without counsel in either the courts or in ADR proceedings are horrendous,
as legal counsel for employers maintain a significant repeat player
advantage.
Meanwhile, organized labor has a shameful history of discriminating
against black workers, and its continuing approach of discounting race
demands a positive response by unions to foster racial justice. Also, as
some unions openly fight affirmative action efforts to remedy racial
discrimination through the pursuit of reverse discrimination lawsuits, these
actions add to the immediacy of the need for organized labor to adopt a
racial justice agenda. With labor's diminishing capacity, it is crucial that
unions embrace some form of racial justice as more people of color enter
the workplace and become potential union members. Nevertheless, a union
must still balance the needs of its diverse constituents. Issues of seniority
and class solidarity can get intertwined with racial justice. and racial
identity issues. Navigating these intricacies of race and class is essential
for unions because employers can capitalize on any fragmentation between
organized labor and its black members.
One way to accomplish a fair balance of race and class for unions is
by helping to provide unbundled legal services for individual black
employees in the processing of their employment discrimination claims
either in court or ADR proceedings. By funneling union dues and payroll
deductions (with the support of the union and black caucuses within the
union) into the development and funding of legal service plans, unions can
identify a racial justice service that they are providing. Similarly, members
of black union caucuses can see their union dues go directly toward racial
justice within the structure of the overall union environment.
In filling the legal representation void for employment discrimination
claimants, unions may start to reverse their decline in membership while

280. Schwartz, supra note 105, at 657 (noting that legal representation of white males in

these claims is becoming a growth industry).
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seeking racial justice in the workplace at the same time. There is no time
better than the present. Given the declining state of unions and the
considerable barriers to successfully litigating employment discrimination
claims in 2004, this might be the last chance for unions to seriously attain
some form of racial justice. At this critical time for racial justice and while
navigating the race and class divide that still permeates in our working
class society, providing legal representation to individual employees
seeking employment discrimination claims presents a worthwhile and
feasible mechanism for unions to finally embrace racial justice.

